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Campaign Finance and the Ecology of Democratic Speech
Michael Kent Curtis& Eugene D. Mazo'
Biologists have contributed to our understanding of the world's
ecosystems, explaining how the natural world is populated by different
species, which are able to thrive and blossom because of the existence of
other species in the rightproportion. In similar fashion, the authors of this
article believe that the political world has an ecosystem. It is an ecosystem
where free speech may thrive or wither, and its fate rests on the delicate
balance of political influence between citizens and corporations. This
balance is disturbed when concentrations of wealth funnel into the
democratic process through campaign spending. The Supreme Court,
through its decisions in several recent campaign finance cases, has
impermissiblyaltered ourpoliticalecosystem in favor of corporatespeech in
ways that now threaten free speech. This state of affairs, the authorsargue,
is antitheticalto the history of the Firstand Fourteenth Amendments and
holds grave consequences for our democracy's future.
INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has often said that freedom of expression supports
democracy and popular sovereignty. After all, freedom of expression is partly
designed so that "government may be responsive to the will of the people.", It
"presupposes that right conclusions" come from "a multitude of tongues," not from
"any kind of authoritative selection."' Freedom of expression assumes that the

' Mr. and Andrew Verstein for commenting on several earlier drafts, as well as Professors Joshua
Douglas of the University of Kentucky College of Law and Richard Albert of Boston College Law
School for their extensive written comments on later drafts. They also gratefully acknowledge Matt
Antonelli, Tom Filopoulos, Jaime GarciaCurtis is the Judge Donald Smith Professor of Constitutional
and Public Law at Wake Forest University. He holds a J.D. from the University of North Carolina. Mr.
Mazo is Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at Wake Forest University. He holds a J.D. from Stanford.
The authors wrote this article together and their names are listed in alphabetical order. They thank their
Wake Forest colleagues Gwen Parker, Miles Foy, Harold Lloyd, , Sam Keenan, Daniel Rice, Roger
Rizzo, Tim Steward, and Alysia Yi for their excellent research assistance, and Elizabeth Johnson and
Catherine Irwin-Smiler for their superb library assistance. Finally, they are grateful for the help they
received from the excellent editors at the Kentucky Law Journal, especially from Shannon Church and
Ben Monarch.
2Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
3New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (quoting United States v. Associated
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
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speech of some is to be answered by the speech of others.4 In its origins, our free
speech system challenged hierarchy. It empowered many diverse voices to speak,
celebrated multiple perspectives, and limited the power of the privileged few to
dominate public discourse.s The American political system was designed to serve
the interests of 'We the People," and through suffrage this category has happily
expanded over time.' The view that freedom of expression is anti-hierarchical
makes the people sovereigns rather than subjects. It assumes that, if they are
provided with diverse sources of information, citizens have the capacity to discuss
and to decide their political destiny and that they have the wisdom to judge their
leaders. This perspective gives the people the right to select who will govern them,
allows the people to assess how well their institutions function, and encourages the
people to contribute to the world in which they live.'
This article deals with the campaign finance decisions of the Roberts Court and
tries to place them in a much larger context. The larger context helps illuminate
why and how these decisions threaten our democratic system. In one important
case, Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court decided that for-profit
corporations can spend money from their corporate treasury funds to support or
oppose candidates for public office and that such corporate expenditures "do not
give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption."' The Supreme Court
assumed this to be true despite it's profound lack of experience with what our
society would look like with unlimited corporate spending on American political
campaigns. Citizens United has since allowed corporations to spend unlimited
amounts of their resources on advertisements in the media to influence elections,
and this has helped to produce a situation where very wealthy interests have come
to dominate American politics. 9
In this article we will often use the term corporation conventionally; for
example, commenting on a corporation's ability to spend for political purposes or
referring to the wishes of a corporation. Still, the reader should recall that these
shorthand personifications of the corporation are misleading if taken
literally-corporations are artificial legal entities; they have no wishes and do not
simply act, speak, and/or donate. Rather corporate executives typically perform
these actions. Corporations do not literally decide to spend "their" money for
political purposes; corporate executives decide to spend other people's money
(funds controlled by the corporate executives) for political purposes. Each time, as
C Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("If there be time
to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education,
the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.").
s See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, at xvix-xxvi (rev. ed. 2009).

6

Id. at 296.

See generallyMichael Kent Curtis, Democratic Ideals and Media Realities:A Puzzling Free Press
Paradox, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y J., July 2004, at 385 [hereinafter Curtis, Democratic Ideals] (discussing
how freedom of expression is essential to a democratic government).

*588 U.S. 310, 314, 365 (2010).
See Charles Riley, Campaign 2012: Billionaires to the Rescue, CNN MONEY (Feb. 11, 2012,
2:02 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/10/news/economy/super--pac(-billionaires.
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in the following sentences, when we refer to what the corporation does, we ask you
to recall the fuller meaning of the shorthand phrase and how taking the metaphor
literally will hide the major part of what is going on."o For "corporate" political
spending, Professor Charles Lindblom has summarized the essence of the problem:
"The effect of granting the enterprise a citizen's rights in addition to rights already
enjoyed by participants in the enterprise is to confer great special powers on groups
of enterprise executives who can make use of corporate assets and personnel in
addition to exercising the rights and powers they enjoy as individual citizens."n
In addition to extending the protections of the First Amendment to for-profit
corporations and allowing them to participate in the outcomes of elections,1 2 the
Supreme Court, in another case, McCutcheon v. FEC, struck down the aggregate
limitations that Congress had placed on individual campaign contributions."
Previously, a wealthy individual could donate no more than $123,200 during each
two-year election cycle to all federal candidates, campaigns, parties, or political
committees combined.14 Now he can give as much as $3.6 million."
In another case, Davis v. FEC, the Supreme Court struck down a federal
provision that increased the amount of campaign contributions a poorer political
candidate who happened to be facing a wealthy, self-financed opponent could
receive." Known as the "Millionaire's Amendment," the provision tripled the
maximum contribution limit for federal candidates whose opponents spent more
than $350,000 of their own personal funds to support their campaigns." The
Supreme Court struck down this provision, even though the increased contribution
limits it allowed would never have gone so far as to permit the less-well-funded
candidate to exceed the total amount spent by his wealthy opponent.'" The Court
reasoned, however, that wealthy politicians might be reluctant to spend part of
their vast fortunes on campaign speech if they know that a poorly-financed
opponent would have an easier time responding." In short, the Supreme Court
objected to this provision in federal campaign finance law because the threat of
counter-speech made possible by the government might chill a wealthy person's
speech.20
In a fourth case, Arizona Free Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, the Supreme Court struck down an Arizona statute that provided for
1 See generally GEORGE LAKOFF 8 MARKJOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY ch. 3,7 (Univ.
of Chicago Press 2d ed.) (2003).
" CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, THE MARKET SYSTEM: WHAT IT IS, How IT WORKS, AND WHAT
TO MAKE OF IT 239 (Yale Univ. Press) (2001).
12 Citizens United, 588 U.S. at 337-39.
13 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014).
14 Id. at 1443.
s Id. at 1473 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16 554 U.S. 724, 729, 744 (2008).
17 Id. at 729.
" Id. at 729-30, 744.
" See id. at 738-39.
20 Id. at 741-42.
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voluntary public financing of campaigns for statewide office. 2' This specific reform,
which was enacted by the people of Arizona through a ballot initiative, contained a
limited "catch-up" provision that was designed to help a publically financed
candidate who was outspent by a better-funded opponent.22 If the wealthy
candidate opted out of the state's public financing system and outspent the publicly
funded candidate, the state provided the publically funded candidate with limited
additional matching funds. 23 This Supreme Court decision again entrenched the
right of the wealthy to be free from responsive speech that was assisted by public
funds. It also undermined the effectiveness of Arizona's public financing system.
We believe that these and other recent Supreme Court campaign finance
decisions were not correctly decided, in part because the Supreme Court failed to
view them within the larger ecosystem they affect. The evolutionary biologist
Stephen Jay Gould wrote about the evolution of life on earth: not only about how
life came to be, but also about how different species must exist with each other in
appropriate proportions in order to produce a healthy ecosystem.24 We argue that
our political system is similar to the natural environment. Indeed, our political
system is an ecosystem. Like other ecosystems, this ecosystem is fragile, and it can
be disrupted. Democratic free speech has always had a place in this ecosystem, and
corporations have too. However, with decisions like Citizens United, McCutcheon,
Davis, and Arizona Free Enterprise, the Supreme Court has impermissibly altered
the political ecosystem we once knew. These Supreme Court decisions have
changed the evolutionary path of our political ecosystem to the point where
corporate and wealthy interests now dominate most political discussion. 25
These Supreme Court decisions are troubling. They are inconsistent with the
purposes of free speech in a democracy. They misunderstand and distort the
Constitution's text when it is read in light of history. They run contrary to the basic
structure of our democratic government. They also entrench hierarchy and
2 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011).
22

Id.

23

Id.

24

See generally STEPHEN JAY GOULD, BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS:

REFLECTIONS IN

NATURAL HISTORY (1991) (detailing human's natural history through a collection of essays);
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, I HAVE LANDED: THE END OF A BEGINNING IN NATURAL HISTORY (2002)
(explaining evolutionary theory through a collection of essays); Stephen Jay Gould, Reconstructing (and
Deconstructing) the Past, in THE BOOK OF LIFE (Stephen Jay Gould ed., 2d ed. 2001) (detailing the
progression of fossil iconography and explaining how art and science can fuse together to tell the story of
life); STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE PANDA'S THUMB: MORE REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY
(1980) (explaining evolution through a collection of essays).
25 That is true whether or not elections are directly involved. Any system where one point of view
gets dramatically differential access over competitors has the hallmarks of a propaganda system. A 2011
Newsweek article by Sharon Begley suggests that climate change has reached the catastrophic stage at
which large-scale disruption by severe weather is the new normal. See Sharon Begley, The Reality of
Global Climate Change is Upon Us, NEWSWEEK (May 29, 2011, 10:00 AM),
http://www.newsweek.com/reality-global-climate-change-upon-us-67757. The article quotes economist
Jeffrey Sachs as saying, "[t]he country is two decades behind in taking action because both parties are in
thrall to Big Oil and Big Coal . . . . The airways are filled with corporate-financed climate
misinformation." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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undermine popular sovereignty. In issuing these decisions, the Supreme Court
failed to understand that free speech is part of a fragile ecology. When we tamper
with that ecology, it can quickly become endangered. When that happens, some
speech no longer has an adequate chance of influencing democratic
decision-making. Such decision-making works best not when one party is allowed
to broadcast its message louder than others, but when many different parties are
able to influence the conversation. In discussing these Supreme Court decisions,
our goal is to use the idea of an ecosystem to place them in larger context. Our view
that the political system maintains a unique ecology, like natural ecosystems do, is
not just a metaphor. Rather, this ecology is very real, and democratic free speech
and corporations have traditionally both been important to its existence. But the
people's speech, and their influence in the ecosystem, is now being subsumed.
America's political ecosystem is now being pushed further from its democratic
ideals. This article attempts to examine this phenomenon and to place democratic
free speech in the larger context in which it deserves to be understood. 26
I. THE NATURE OF ECOSYSTEMS

A. The Metaphor
The natural environment has an ecology, albeit one much affected by human
activity. Indeed, we are part of that environment. In the natural environment there
are organisms and special spaces they inhabit. The environmentally conscious are
concerned with preserving diversity in the natural environment and preserving
spaces where diverse species can exist and survive. An invasive organism can
threaten diversity by making a space hostile to other organisms. In addition, one
species can take over much of the space, driving out many others. Human activity
can and periodically does make some spaces less hospitable for diverse forms of life.
Often, we hope, it may also make space more hospitable for human habitation.
Free speech and democracy are vital organisms of our political ecosystem.
Democratic free speech needs spaces where people can actually speak. Democracy
requires spaces that are open for speech on public affairs and where civil society can
flourish. Shrinking these spaces limits liberty for many natural persons. By limiting
opportunities to speak, we limit equality." Likewise, democracy requires a diversity
of voices that have a reasonable chance of being heard and, by extension,
influencing decisions. The opportunity to assemble and speak in suitable public
places enhances one's chance of being heard-as anyone who has ever been to a
26 Throughout this article, we use the phrase "democratic free speech" to refer to the rights that
encompass the freedom of expression. These include the rights of free speech, free press, petition, and
assembly, all of which are listed in the First Amendment and incorporated by reference in the
Fourteenth Amendment as a limit on the states.
27 Cf Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV. 143,
159-160 (2010) (Arguing that support for free speech cuts across conventional political allegiances, and
that those on both sides of the aisle are committed to free speech, but to two different versions of it,
depending on whether free speech is meant to protect political liberty or political equality.).
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public demonstration can attest. Changes in the political, legal, and economic
environment can reduce diversity and can contract the space inhabited by
democratic dialogue. When we categorize previously open spaces as "private," they
close. And if no other equally effective, diverse, and egalitarian system emerges, our
ecological system changes and contracts. The environment becomes less hospitable
to free speech.
B. The People and the Corporations
Corporations are not like people. They possess unlimited life. Limited liability
for shareholders and other devices allow them to accumulate vast wealth." Living
people may act on their purely selfish economic interests, and many do. Still,
research shows that living people often vote based on a conception of the public
good, which may differ from their individual economic interest.29 In contrast, those
who control corporations are, by one widely held view of their role, expected to act
to increase corporate wealth.30 Often their interests can be narrow." If the interest
in maximizing a corporation's wealth is starkly contrary to the public interest, then,
according to the conventional wisdom, corporations are expected to pursue the
corporate interest, not the public interest.32 To act in the public interest, but in a
way that harms the corporation financially, would be regarded as an improper
deviation from this expected role. This is not to say, of course, that all
corporations do things only contrary to the public interest. But a number of them
do, and when that happens, such corporations can often be found to use their
political influence, often very effectively, to further their own narrow interests.
Of course, to blame only corporations, wealthy donors, and politicians for the
woes of our political systems is also simplistic. It would be a mistake to envision a
lost Garden of Eden, an ideal place that existed during the time of the framers
before the serpent of self-interested wealth and power slithered in and wreaked
havoc.34 Both corporations and wealthy donors function in and are affected by our
2

See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658-59 (1990); see also Anne

Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A CorporateLaw Analysis ofFree Speech and CorporatePersonhoodin

Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 523 (2010).
29 See ROBERT KUTTNER, EvERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS
338 (Univ. Chi. Press 1999) (1997) (explaining that "voters tended to reward or punish incumbent
legislators based on how they perceived the collectivity to be doing, not how well the voter was doing
personally.").
3o

See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 469-70 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and

dissenting in part).
3 See Tucker, supra note 28, at 521-22 (noting that corporations "are legally required to represent
not a group of people but a legally defined set of interests-the interests of a fictional creature called a
shareholder that has no associations, economic incentives or political views other than a desire to

profit").
3 See id.; see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 469-70 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
" Tucker, supra note 28, at 524.
* See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE":
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 52-116 (2000) [hereinafter
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democratic free speech system. But our way of financing campaigns threatens that
system. It also promotes insidious and pervasive corruption, and it increasingly
undermines the power of individual integrity. In the past, our political ecosystem
created more of a check on the power of corruption by those with great wealth.
These checks were effective to some extent. For instance, they prevented
corporations from contributing money directly to political candidates, required
disclosure for political spending, and forbade corporations and unions from
spending money without limit on political causes. 35
After Citizens United was decided, this began to change. In one stroke, that
decision made the popular sovereignty's protection from systemic corruption
increasingly difficult. A five-to-four majority of the Supreme Court interpreted the
free speech system and the text of the Constitution to empower corporations to
spend unlimited amounts of money from their corporate treasury funds to influence
electoral contests. 6 Corporate power and concentrated wealth, already extensive,
were enhanced.3 ' Those who controlled corporate treasuries suddenly found that
they could use the immense resources of a corporation to support compliant
politicians and to target non-compliant ones. 38 The Citizens United decision made
it harder for politicians who naturally wanted to continue in office to be faithful to
the people's trust. Indeed, the mere threat of a punishing corporate media blitz or a
negative ad campaign paid for by a corporate treasury or a private billionaire may
sway a politician without either actually spending a dime.
When the interest of the corporate bottom line collides with the public interest,
the government needs to regulate. But our system of financing elections makes
politicians dependent on and sensitive to corporate spending, or at least its threat."
Our system of campaign finance, constructed in good part by the Supreme Court,
can and often does distort the structural purposes of democratic government. There
are many examples that illustrate how our failure to regulate the political activities
of corporations leads to a greater divide between the public and corporate interests.
Large corporations in the oil and gas industry, like Exxon and BP, have long urged
Congress not to encourage competition by providing tax breaks to rival companies
exploring new sources of energy.40 Similarly, the oil and gas industry has supported
CURTIS, FREE SPEECH]; see generallyCHARLES SACKETT SYDNOR, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARIES
IN THE MAKING: POLITICAL PRACTICES IN WASHINGTON'S VIRGINIA (1965) (examining the
political structure of Virginia pre-revolution and noting its aristocratic origins).
3 See generalyCURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 34.
36 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 314, 365.
31 See Michael Hiltzik, Five Years After Citizens United Ruling, Big Money Reigns, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-20150125-column.html.

" See id.
3
See

Zephyr

Teachout,

Legalized

Bribery,

N.Y.

TIMES,

Jan.

26,

2015,

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/opinion/zephyr-teachout-on-sheldon-silver-corruption-and-newyork-politics.html ("In our private financing system, candidates are trained to respond to campaign cash
and serve donors' interests.").
' Andy Kroll, Triumph ofthe Drill, MOTHERJONES, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014
(last visited May 18, 2015). During the Carter
/04/oil-subsidies-renewable-energy-tax-breaks
Administration, Congress provided tax credits and other incentives to encourage conservation and the
development of solar, wind, and other alternative-energy sources. Congress ended the tax credits during
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efforts to cast doubt on the dangers of global warming and the contribution of
fossil fuels to the problem.41 The tobacco industry supported a public campaign to
deny the addictive properties of cigarettes and to cast doubt on the connection
between smoking and disease.42 The pharmaceutical industry has opposed
regulations that would ban the practice of feeding antibiotics to farm animals, a
practice that produces more antibiotic resistant organisms.4 3 Threats to our
democratic system often come from private wealth and corporate power. As such,
changes that empower corporations or a few wealthy individuals to spend unlimited
amounts of money on political ads can pose a major threat to democracy and to the
historic democracy-promoting ideals of free speech.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ECOLOGY OF FREE SPEECH

As every biologist knows, an ecosystem evolves and takes shape slowly, over the
course of time. Similarly, the evolution of the free speech system in this country
evolved over a long period of time. By the 1960s, it had matured to the point where
speech took hold as one of the main components of our political ecosystem. But
individual speech did not begin this way. It is worth examining some of the history
of individual speech and how it has evolved into its current state.
A. PrerevolutionaryBeginnings
Some basic dissenting democratic free speech ideas emerged in England in the
seventeenth century. A group called the Levellers sought greater democracy and
religious tolerance and argued for the right of free press and petition and against
rules that treated criticism of government and public officials as sedition." Starting
from their seventeenth-century origins and continuing up to the American Civil
War and beyond, the first broadly protective free speech ideas were strikingly
egalitarian. First, they protected the right of naturalpersons to speak, even when it
came to very controversial issues or challenging elite views. Second, they assumed
that the power to speak and to be able to reach an audience of citizens should be
widely dispersed. Finally, they thought ideas and views could be effectively
the Reagan Administration, in part because the oil-and-gas industry, including Exxon and BP, lobbied
to end them.
4 See DAVID MICHAELS, DOUBT IS THEIR PRODUCT: How INDUSTRY'S ASSAULT ON
SCIENCE THREATENS YOUR HEALTH 200-02 (2008).
42 See id. at 204; see generally PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE
ASBESTOS
INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985) (chronicling the actions of corporations in the tobacco industry); RUSSELL
MOKHIBER, CORPORATE CRIME AND VIOLENCE: BIG BUSINESS POWER AND THE ABUSE OF THE
PUBLIC TRUST (1989) (setting out a number of examples of corporate behavior contrary to the public
interest).
" Donald Kennedy, Cows on Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2010, at WK11.
4 See generally CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 34. For an earlier effort to summarize this
history, see Curtis, Democratic Ideals, supra note 7, at 395-403 and Michael Kent Curtis, Judicial
Review and Populism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 313, 337-40 (2003) [hereinafter Curtis, Judicial
Review and Populism].
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answered by counter speech. According to some of these early free speech ideas,
government had an active, positive, and egalitarian role to play in spreading access
to the free speech system. There was, of course, also a counter tradition, one which
thought elites should be able to control the discourse and ban speech that might
have a dangerous tendency, and to do so by direct suppression or by other more
circuitous means.
The idea that "the people" are sovereign can be traced at least to the English
Civil War.4 5 In the 1640s, the Levellers sought a new representative government
for England, with a greatly expanded right to vote. This and other demands were
set out in their Agreement of the People, a written constitution that included
religious toleration and limits on governmental power in the interest of liberty.46
The Agreement, in effect, had an early bill of rights.47 The Levellers insisted that
"the people" were sovereign, not the Parliament or the King in Parliament."8 They
rejected limiting the vote to the wealthy.49 Since legitimate government was based
on the consent of the people, broad suffrage was required: "Every person in
England hath as clear a right to elect his representative as the greatest person in
England," was how one Leveller put it.so All legitimate government was based "in
the free consent of the people."" In turn, government officials were simply "agents"
or "trustees" of the people.s2 Though the Levellers were suppressed and never had
much direct influence on English history, their ideas influenced John Locke and
the Radical Whigs.s" Eventually, these ideas spread to the New World.5 4
The idea that "the people" were sovereign took hold in America. From the
45 See generally H. N. BRAILSFORD, THE LEVELLERS AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 9-10
(1961); JOSEPH FRANK, THE LEVELLERS (1955); THEODORE CALVIN PEASE, THE LEVELLER

MOVEMENT (1916); Michael Kent Curtis, In Pursuit of Liberty: The Levellers and the American Bill
of Rights, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 377-86 (1991) [hereinafter Curtis, Levellers]. For a fine
collection of Leveller pamphlets, see DON MARION WOLFE, LEVELLER MANIFESTOES OF THE

PURITAN REVOLUTION (1944).
4 See generallyAN AGREEMENT OF THE PEOPLE, FOR A FIRME AND PRESENT PEACE, UPON
GROUNDS OF COMMON-RIGHT AND FREEDOME (1647), reprinted in THE LEVELLERS IN THE

ENGLISH REVOLUTION 89-96 (G.E. Aylmer ed., 1975) [hereinafter AN AGREEMENT OF THE
PEOPLE].
4 See generallyid.
41 See id.
49 See id.

so THE PUTNEY DEBATES (1647), reprintedin THE LEVELLERS IN THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION
109 (G.E. Aylmer ed., 1975).
s Id.
52 See AN AGREEMENT OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 46, at 90 (noting that the power of the
Representative is inferior only to those who choose them; see also Curtis, Levellers, supra note 45, at
367 ("The Levellers' radical metaphor for the relation of Parliament to the people was that of agency.
The people were the principal; Parliament was the agent.").
s Curtis, Levelers, supra note 45, at 389 (citing RICHARD ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY
POLITICS AND LOCKE'S TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 149 (1986)).
54 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1-2 (U.S. 1776); Curtis, Levellers, supra
note 45, at 392-93. For direct connections of American colonists with the English Revolution and the
Levellers, see Adrian Tinniswood, America's Revolution: The Prequel, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/04/opinion/04tinniswood.html.
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perspective of popular sovereignty, presidents, congressmen, and senators are
merely agents, servants, or trustees of the people.ss In state constitutions of the
Revolutionary era, the agency or trustee metaphor was common and explicit. The
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 provided "[t]hat all power [was] originally
inherent in, and consequently derived from the people; therefore all officers of
government, whether legislative or executive, are their trustees and servants, and at
all times accountable to them."56 State constitutions in Virginia, Vermont,
Delaware, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire also used the agent, servant, or
trustee metaphor.s" The clear implication was that public officials have a fiduciary
duty to govern in the interest of their principal.
That principal, of course, was "the people," and the great Leveller insight was
that the agents or trustees were not the same as the principal." The people's
"agents" or "trustees" might pursue interests not in keeping with those of "the
people."" The danger in all agency or trustee relationships is that the agent or
trustee will be seduced to pursue the interests of other persons or institutions, thus
violating his fiduciary duty of loyalty to his principal.60 As James Madison said on
Tuesday, June 26, 1787, at the Constitutional Convention, "[T]hose charg[ed]
with the public happiness, might betray their trust."6 ' The framers of the
Constitution were familiar with this problem. In Federalist No. 62, James Madison
wrote, "It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less
degree than to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their
obligations to their constituents and prove unfaithful to their important trust. "62
The framers sought to deal with this problem in a variety of ways. In England, for
example, the King and his chief ministers would often give offices to the members
of the House of Commons, but the positions could be revoked. This was a potent
ss See AN AGREEMENT OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 46, at 90 (noting that the power of the
Representative is inferior only to those who choose them).
56 PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of
Rights, art. IV.
* DEL. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights § 5; N.H. CONST., Bill of Rights, art. VIII; R.I.
CONST. of 1790, art. II; VT. CONST. of 1777, Declaration of Rights, art. V; VA. CONST. of 1776,

Declaration of Rights § 2.
s Like all metaphors, the agency or trustee metaphor highlights some aspects of reality but obscures
others. The people can fire their agents or servants at specified periods; but they cannot give them
binding instructions. Still, the central idea is dear. The agents, servants, or trustees have a fiduciary duty
to govern in the interest of their principal, who are the sovereign-or, as one social scientist called them,

semi-sovereign-people. See E.E. SCHATISCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S
VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1975).
51 See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 65 (1989); Curtis, Levellers, supra note 45, at 367.
6 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (2006).
61 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 193
(Ohio Univ. Press 1984) [hereinafter MADISON, DEBATES]. One effort to deal with the threat of

corruption was "to divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might watch & check each
other." Id.
2 THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also Zephyr
Teachout, The Anti-CorruptionPrinciple, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 370 (2009).
63 See DORMAN B. EATON, CIVIL SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN 45-46 (1880).
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way of controlling their votes.64 In the Constitution, the framers found a way to
deal with the danger that one of the members of Congress might be seduced by
being dependent on the largess of the executive and would violate their fiduciary
duty: "[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member
of either House during his Continuance in Office."6 s
B. The Foundersand the FirstAmendment
Popular sovereignty was how the framers of our Constitution justified their
failure to follow the route for amendment that was required by the Articles of
Confederation. Instead of the unanimity for amendment required by the Articles,
the framers allowed ratification of their new Constitution to proceed by the vote of
nine of the thirteen states. 6 This rejection of the unanimity requirement was
justified by the republican principle that ultimate political power resides in "the
people," who retain the right to "alter or abolish" governments.
As a result, the Constitution declared that it was created by "We the People.""
It was based on the idea that "the People" are sovereign. The members of the
House of Representatives (and now the Senate) are elected by the people in their
states. 6 9 In practice, the people also now choose the president.70 The politically
enfranchised "people" has expanded since 1787. Which group of people should
constitute "the People" has at times been contested, of course, but what is more
rarely contested is that our government has properly and increasingly become more
democratic through its inclusion of previously excluded groups: the poor, 7 ' African
Americans, 7 2 women,73 and people eighteen years of age or older. 74 The expansion
of formal democracy represents an unfolding of the ideals of the Declaration of
Independence (and of the Levellers) that legitimate government should rest on the
" See id.
6s U.S. CONST. art.

1, § 6, cl. 2.

6 U.S. CONST. art. VII.

See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
" U.S. CONST. pmbl.
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
71 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("For the President and
the Vice President of the United States are the only elected officials who represent all the voters in the
Nation." (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 794-795 (1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
" U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any
primary or other election for President or Vice President . . . shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or any State by reason or failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.").
72 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude.").
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.").
' U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen
years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of age.").
67
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consent of the governed.7 s
Knowing what America's political ecosystem looked like at the time of the
founding is essential to understanding how our democracy was meant to function.
This requires examining the ideas of the time, and looking closely at the
Constitution, the purposes for which it was created, and how its design was meant
to further the ideal of representative government.
One way to understand the Constitution is in light of its text. The First
Amendment provides that, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the government for a redress of grievances."" Throughout the Bill of
Rights, various rights are repeatedly referred to as rights "of the people."" These
rights were designed to be the rights of naturalpersons." That is obvious, for
example, in the protection of the right of assembly. At the time the First
Amendment was ratified, corporations of the size, type, and power that would
become common two hundred years later simply did not exist." There were no
artificial legal entities "to assemble," for example, for purposes of holding protests,
singing songs, or waiving signs. Corporations did not speak, and they did not write
either, though they later may have hired people to do these things for them.
Everything we know about the text and history of the First Amendment suggests
that it was meant to apply to the rights of natural persons."
James Madison led the fight to create a federal Bill of Rights in the first
Congress; he drafted the initial proposals that were debated."' Madison referred to
the rights in the Bill of Rights as "the great rights of mankind." 2 His words suggest
that he was seeking to protect the rights of natural, living people. Madison's first
draft of what eventually became the First Amendment is consistent with this
understanding. It referred to the rights of speech and of the press in a way that is
consistent with the idea that these rights should belong to natural persons: "The
people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to
publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks
of liberty, shall be inviolable."" Though the wording of the First Amendment was
I THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). For Leveller antecedents of this
idea, see generally THE PUTNEY DEBATES OF 1647: THE ARMY, THE LEVELLERS AND THE
ENGLISH STATE (Michael Mendale ed., 2001).
7

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

7 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . .. ." (emphasis added)).
" See DAVID H. GANS & DOUGLAS T. KENDALL, A CAPITALIST JOKER: THE STRANGE
ORIGINS, DISTURBING PAST AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF CORPORATE PERSONHOOD IN
AMERICAN LAW 24 (2010).
" See id. at 6-17.
s Indeed, the Court in Citizens United relied very heavily on its non-contextual reading of the First
Amendment of the Constitution. Id. at 6-11.
s1 Bill of Rights, NAT'L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/bor (last visited
May 18, 2015).
82 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 449 (1789).
" Id. at 451.
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changed, there is little reason to think that the changes were designed to protect
corporations. Taken together, these examples reinforce Madison's point that the
rights in the Bill of Rights are the rights of human beings.
There were other characteristics of the right to free speech embraced by those
who over time contributed to a robust and protective free speech tradition. The
most important of these was the view that speech was anti-hierarchical. The right
to speak assumed that ordinary people had important contributions to make to
public dialogue, and that, given adequate information from multiple perspectives,
the people were equipped to make political decisions and contribute to charting the
course of their governments. Writing in 1800, Tunis Wortman, a Democratic
lawyer and politician, insisted that "every intellectual Being is possessed of the
attribute of judgment . . . [and that] the common medium of such discriminating
faculty, is abundantly sufficient to decide upon customary details of human
affairs."8 4 Implicit in this view was the idea that a political system in which wealth
dominated discussion would be contrary to the function of the democratic free
speech system."s In short, the twin ideas that free speech was meant to protect
individuals and that it was also meant to be anti-hierarchical were shared by many
citizens before the Civil War, as well as later. Knowledge was prized, and the best
knowledge was thought to come about when different perspective and multiple
viewpoints could be heard.
In important respects, early in our history, the Constitution, the Congress, and
many states did much to create and foster an ecosystem hospitable to democracy
and freedom of expression. The Constitution provided for, and the Congress early
on created, the postal system, post offices, and post roads that facilitated a national
system of freedom of expression. Congress subsidized the delivery of newspapers
and provided for free newspaper exchanges." States also acted. The New England
states began to develop a system of public education. And by the late nineteenth
century, Congress interpreted the Republican Government Clause to require new
states seeking admission to the union to have free nonsectarian public schools."
Of course, it is important to point out that the ideal of the robust democratic
free speech system that we have outlined here was also contested during this time,
and in fact many people rejected it. The courts, for example, were slow to embrace
it. Back in 1798, the Federalists passed the Sedition Act, which made "false and
malicious" criticism of the President and the Congress a crime. In the 1830s, mobs
14

CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 34, at 98.

s Id. at 63-77, 86-87. In 1848, Frederick Grimke, a judge on the Ohio Supreme Court, explained
how mankind acquired the knowledge to make wise decisions "when [knowledge] is communicated in
detail." FREDERICK GRIMKE, THE NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE INSTITUTIONS 400 (John
William Ward ed., 1968). Grimke attributed the progress that had been made in free speech to
complaints made by people who were "in the inferior walks of life." Id. In short, in the early nineteenth
century, even the elite of this country understood that their wealth and power could be challenged from
below, and that this challenge came in the form of democracy and free speech.
6
PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
COMMUNICATIONS 84-94 (2004).

" Id. at 99-107.
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attempted to silence abolitionists and keep slavery off the national political agenda.
During this time, many of the Southern states passed statutes that banned
expressions with a "tendency" to make slaves discontent. In 1860, a minister in
North Carolina was convicted of a crime and sentenced to jail under such a statute
for circulating Helper's Impending Crisis, a book arguing for state-by-state
abolition in the South." Such events shrunk the space for democratic free
expression.
In addition to the contested visions about the scope of free speech, a number of
those in the founding generation were concerned with the potentially corrupting
influence of wealth. This concern fit their devotion to creating a republican and
representative government for "We the People." During the days of the
Constitutional Convention, James Madison was afraid that the poor would despoil
the rich." Once Madison saw the new government under the Constitution in
operation, however, he began to worry about the opposite.90
In September 1792, Madison wrote that political parties were "natural to most
political societies." 91 Madison identified one party as consisting of those who "are
" TIMOTHY WESLEY, THE POLITICS OF FAITH DURING THE CIVIL WAR 30 (LSU Press)
(2013); (see also HINTON HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOUTH: How TO MEET IT

(1857).
'9 As Madison warned the Convention:
An increase of population will of necessity increase the proportion of those who will labour
under all the hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings.
These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of indigence.
According to the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the hands of the former. No
agrarian attempts have yet been made in this Country, but symptoms, of a leveling spirit, as
we have understood, have sufficiently appeared in a certain quarters to give notice of the
future danger.
MADISON, DEBATES, supra note 61, at 194. Madison's solution was a long term for senators who were
to be respected for wisdom and virtue. See id. at 195.
* See James Madison, Parties, NATL GAZETTE, Jan. 23, 1792, reprinted in JAMES MADISON,
WRITINGS 504, 504-05 (1999) [hereinafter Madison, Parties]; see also STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC
McKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 136-145 (1995) (discussing Madison's concern that
speculators with inside information had bought settlement certificates from Revolutionary soldiers at a
fraction of their value and loan certificates from those who had lent money to fund the Revolution-also
at a fraction of their value-and his unsuccessful effort to arrive at a more equitable division with the
new government assumed these debts); James Madison, A Candid State ofParties, NAT'L GAZETIE,
Sept. 26, 1792, reprinted in JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 530-32 [hereinafter Madison, A Candid
State ofParties].
91 Madison, A Candid State of Parties, supra note 90, at 531. In Madison's view, parties were
inevitable. See id. at 504. They were naturally created by a difference in real or supposed interests. See
id. Madison recommended:
The great object should be to combat the evil: 1. By establishing a political equality among
all. 2. By withholding unnecessary opportunities from a few, to increase the inequality of
property, by an immoderate, and especially an unmerited, accumulation of riches. 3. By the
silent operation of laws, which, without violating the rights of property, reduce extreme
wealth towards a state of mediocrity, and raise extreme indigence towards a state of comfort.
Id. Though unforeseen by the Framers, political parties soon become crucial components in the
American political ecosystem.
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more partial to the opulent than to the other classes of society,"92 remarking on
how they "naturally wish to point the measures of government less to the interest of
the many than of a few, and less to the reason of the many than to their
weaknesses."9 3 Madison worried about how very great disparities in wealth would
influence government to further the interests of the wealthy few against the many.
As he saw it, the wealthier party, "being the weaker in point of numbers, will be
induced by the most obvious motives to strengthen themselves with the men of
influence, particularly the moneyed, which is the most active and insinuating
influence." 94
Madison was not alone in recognizing that concentrated wealth was a threat to
democratic government. In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote Democracy in
America, a book that described the basic arrangements that constituted American
democracy. 9s As part of his constitutional discussion, de Tocqueville also discussed
state laws that had eliminated primogeniture, the inheritance of property by the
eldest son:

.

[W]hile political laws are only the symbol of a nation's condition, [laws of
inheritance] exercise an incredible influence upon its social state. . . . When the
legislator has once regulated the law of inheritance, he may rest from his labour.
. . When framed in a particular manner, this law unites, draws together, and vests
property and power in a few hands; its tendency is clearly aristocratic. [Formed
o]n opposite principles ... it divides, distributes, and disperses both property and
power. ... [I]t gradually reduces or destroys every obstacle, until by its incessant
activity the bulwarks of the influence of wealth are ground down to the fine and
shifting sand which is the basis of democracy."6

Of course, this contrast between individual wealth and inheritance is
incomplete. De Tocqueville was writing before the birth of large corporations. Still,
he recognized how legally constructed economic arrangements could work to shape
political reality. By de Tocqueville's logic, the great concentration of wealth
functioned to place political power in the hands of a very few. Following a de
Tocqueville line of reasoning further, many would later see the repeal of the
inheritance tax and the repeal of the rule against perpetuities as working to move
the political system in a more aristocratic or oligarchic direction." One obvious way
this happens is by further increasing the resources those with great wealth could
devote to supporting rent seeking policies that will increase and perpetuate their
wealth.
92 Id. at 531.
9

Id.

94

Id.

See generallyALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans., 7th
ed. 1847).
96 Id. at 49.
9
See Ray D. Madoff, America Builds an Aristocracy, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/opinion/
12madoff html; see also Carl Hulse, Estate Tax Is Expiring, but Death Won't Last, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/18/us/politics/18cong.html.
9s
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Daniel Webster, though far from a full-fledged democrat, expressed ideas
similar to those of de Tocqueville. "A republican form of government," Webster
insisted, "rests not more on political constitutions, than on those laws which
regulate the descent and transmission of property."9 8 Webster explained that "[t]he
freest government, if it could exist, would not be long acceptable, if the tendency of
the laws were to create a rapid accumulation of property in few hands, and to
render the great mass of the population dependent and penniless."" In this view,
either the people would "break in upon the rights of property" or "the influence of
property" would "limit and control the exercise of popular power."o Others would
later also suggest that the excessive concentration of economic and corporate power
was a threat to representative government. Certainly, that would become the view
of many Populists and Progressives.' 0
The founders' fear of the corrupting influences of wealth arose from their
experience.o2 Their fear was that wealth would undermine the integrity of the
political system. As Zephyr Teachout has written in her extensive examination of
corruption, the framers were well aware of the frailty of human nature, and yet they
believed that proper structures could both "create virtuous (public-serving) acts"
and "virtuous men."103 The converse is also true; structures may seduce otherwise
virtuous people from the pursuit of the public good. Thus, in writing the new
Constitution, the framers were conscious of trying to create a structure that would
govern their republic correctly and in the right proportions. Notions of popular
sovereignty, representative government, freedom of speech and of the press, of a
fiduciary duty owed by public officials to the people, and that corruption was a
danger were all widely held in the founding era, though the meaning of some of
" Daniel Webster, FirstSettlement of New England (1820), in ANDREw M. SCOTT, POLITICAL
THOUGHT IN AMERICA 199, 199 (1959).
' Id. at 200.
1oo Id.
"o See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
ConstitutionalandAntitrust Analysis, 1880-1918,50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 297-98 (1989)
("[W]hile late nineteenth century political theorists commonly predicted that state favoritism
would spark a battle for the control of government itself and the ultimate subversion of liberal
republican institutions, early antitrust proponents warned that the improper private
attainment of disproportionate economic power could lead to precisely the same catastrophe.
Like the Jacksonian liberals who came before them, antitrust proponents feared both business
domination and popular leveling. Senator Hoar, for example, echoed Senator Sherman's
declaration that the great new combinations already 'reach State authorities' when he warned
in 1890 that the great monopolies constituted a 'menace to republican institutions
themselves.' Fears of political domination by big business were powerfully reiterated in
Congress during the 1914 Clayton Act debates, both in report language and in comments by
individual congressmen." (citations omitted)).
Zephyr Teachout has argued that the framers were obsessed with the danger of corruption and
that they adopted a number of strategies to attempt to avoid it. See Teachout, supra note 62, at 346-73.
Governeur Morris spoke openly about "how '[w]ealth tends to corrupt the mind & to nourish its love
and power.'" Id. at 376. In Teachout's version of the founding period, the framers clearly understood
that both citizens and public officials needed to pursue the public good, rather than be concerned with
private interests. Id. We believe Teachout's analysis to be persuasive.

o Id. at 380.
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these ideas was disputed. Implicit in these ideas was the understanding that a
political system which makes public officials dependent on the very wealthy
undermines the functioning of our democratic free speech system. This view held
steady in the early years of the republic and into the beginning decades of the
nineteenth century.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment
By the middle of the nineteenth century many, but by no means all, Americans
held a robust view of freedom of expression. America's free speech system was
designed, as the Supreme Court would later put it, so that "government may be
responsive to the will of the people."' 04 The system presupposed that the "right
conclusions" come from "a multitude of tongues," not from "any kind of
authoritative selection."'os It assumed that the speech of some is to be answered by
the speech of others.'0o Such a robust view of the right of free speech, and also of
press and petition, developed over time in response to the repression of speech that
had come before. It was crystalized, for example, in response to the Sedition Act of
1798, then by the repression of the Gag Rule in Congress which suppressed the
reading and discussion of anti-slavery petitions, and finally by the repression of
anti-slavery speech in the slave states, including the speech of the Republican Party.
The Republican Party had been born in the 1850s in response to repealing past
compromises and opening all federal territory to slavery.
In Dred Scott v. Sandford the Supreme Court infamously expanded the
political and economic power of slavery.' It did so by holding that Congress,
which had banned slavery in many national territories in the past, now lacked the
constitutional power to do so.' The result was to open vast new areas for slavery
and potentially at least to increase vastly the political power of the slaveholding
economic elite. Though we tend to think of this decision as being about slavery,
Dred Scott was also about speech and democracy. Opponents of slavery and the
"slave power" attacked slavery and the slave-power hierarchy.'09 They strongly
criticized the Dred Scott decision." 0 Abraham Lincoln criticized Dred Scott in his
first inaugural address, while Chief Justice Taney, the author of the decision, was
sitting close by."'
In short order, many advocates of free speech became the critics of slavery. In
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (quoting United States v. Associated
Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
" See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); see also United States v.
Associated Press, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
107 60 U.S. 393, 393-94 (1857).
s Id.
'" See e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Address at Cooper Institute, New York City (Feb. 27, 1860), in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865 111, 111-30 (1989).
no0 See id.
n' Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, (Mar.4, 1861), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES
AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 215, 215-24 (1989).
15

"'
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insisting on a right to discuss all moral, political, and social questions of human
concern, the advocates of free speech rejected the idea that suppression of radical
perspectives, such as calling for the immediate abolition of slavery, could be
justified. They insisted on a public forum for speech, and they rejected the claim
that a government may enforce orthodox opinion." 2 Opponents of slavery also
insisted, unsuccessfully at the time, on a national right to free speech that states
must respect." 3 In the North, the battle over slavery generally ended in a victory for
free speech. Free speech, including the freedom to express the idea that slavery
should be outlawed, led to the triumph of a political movement that had favored
banning slavery from federal territories. In the South before the Civil War, by
contrast, the battle over speech concerning the merits of slavery ended in a victory
for repression.11 State laws and vigilance committees in the South moved to silence
the critics of slavery."s Such speech was too dangerous to be tolerated. Powerful
economic interests sought ways to silence slavery's opponents, and if that was not
possible, then to dominate the debate. Such domination was a substitute for
outright suppression.
The leaders of the slave-owning elite in the South eventually concluded that
secession was the only way they could protect their version of speech, which
rejected all criticism of slavery."' In short, the robust view of free speech
empowered a multitude of voices in this country. Proponents of free speech insisted
on the right of the "outs" to criticize the "ins" and later, in spite of harsh opposition
from Northern and Southern elites, insisted on the right of ordinary citizens to
criticize slavery and the "slave power."" Still, free speech always protected far more
than political speech. While the free speech ideas provided an interdependent web
of justifications for a broadly protective democratic free speech system, they also
protected the rights of Southerners to speak out for the institution of slavery.
Many in the North vehemently disagreed with what was being said in the
South. But at the time of the Civil War, the policies and protections of the Bill of
Rights extended only to the federal government. When it came to speech, as when
it came to slavery, the states were largely free to choose their own destinies and to
follow their own, individual paths.
It would not be until after the Civil War, and long after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, that the Supreme Court began to hold that the rights of
free speech, press, and assembly limited state governments."' Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment provided that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the
112 CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 34, at 53-54.
11 See generallyABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865 (1989) (chronicling

various letters and speeches from Abraham Lincoln regarding topics of slavery and free speech).
114 See CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 34, at
132.
11s Id. at 117-299 (chronicling the story of the struggle for free speech on the subject of slavery).
"6 Id. at 297-298.

"7 Id

.1. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 197-211 (1986) [hereinafter CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL
ABRIDGE].

CAMPAIGN FINANCE

zo14-2015]

547

United States . . . are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they

reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.""' The Fourteenth
Amendment, which was passed after the Civil War, was designed, in part, to
protect the individual's right to freedom of speech, though the Supreme Court was
slow to read it that way.1 20
A common method of understanding the words of a constitutional text is to
look at how they are used elsewhere in the document, especially in the same section
of that document.12' The text of the "Privileges or Immunities Clause" is clearly
limited to natural persons. It refers to "citizens," and only to citizens who are
"persons born or naturalized."' 22 Indeed, prior precedent under Article IV, which
has a somewhat different "privileges and immunities clause," had also long been
held to apply only to natural persons who are citizens, not to corporations.123
Examining the Constitution in this way makes it is clear that the persons to whom
the Fourteenth Amendment referred, like the people to whom the First
Amendment referred, were naturalpersons. The Fourteenth Amendment refers to
persons "born or naturalized" in the United States.1 24 This suggests natural persons,
not artificial entities. Citizens protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause
were natural persons. Corporations were neither citizens nor persons.
History provides another guide to how the Fourteenth Amendment should be
interpreted. The debates about the Fourteenth Amendment and the closely related
issue of Reconstruction are, of course, extensive. Yet these debates, the text of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and prior history all support the view
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect the liberties enumerated
in the Bill of Rights, including those of speech and the press, from being denied to
the people by the states.'2 5 In short, the concern of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment was for the rights of natural persons, not the rights of shoe factories
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10 CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 118, 39-40, 148 (1986).

121 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

123 See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 177 (1868), overruled in part by United States v. S. E.
Underwriters Asss'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); see also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 588-89
(1839). For a fine discussion of the corporation in constitutional law, through the lens of history and
text, see GANS & KENDALL, supra note 78, at 12-21.
124 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

125

See

generally AKHIL
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THE
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CREATION

AND

RECONSTRUCTION (1998); CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 118, at 123; Richard L.
Aynes, Enforcing the Bill of Rights Against the States: The History and the Future, 18 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 77 (2009); Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 103 YALE L. J. 57 (1993); Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights and the States: An
Overview from One Perspective, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3 (2009); Bryan H. Wildenthal,
Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Scholarship and Commentary on the Fourteenth Amendment in
1867-1873, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 153 (2009). Contra, e.g., RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

155-89 (2d ed. 1997).
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and cotton mills, which were starting to become incorporated as for-profit
corporations at the time.
III. CORPORATIONS ENTER THE ECOSYSTEM

So far, we have been writing of free speech and the free speech system. But the
First Amendment also prohibits laws "abridging . . . the freedom . . . of the

press"' 26-and the press, even in the nineteenth century, was slowly starting to
incorporate. Because the First Amendment includes protections for speech as well
as for the press-and because newspapers, book publishers, and the media
companies that would become their offspring could ultimately not ignore the
benefits of incorporation-the umbrella of the political ecosystem would slowly
have to expand to include corporations. However, it took time for this to happen.
In a decision shortly after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, Judge
(later Justice) William Burnham Woods considered the claim that corporations
were entitled to liberties under the Fourteenth Amendment. Following the text, he
rejected that claim:
Are corporations citizens of the United States within the meaning of the
constitutional provision now under consideration? . . . Who are citizens of the
United States, within the meaning of the 14th amendment, we think is clearly
settled by the terms of the amendment itself. 'All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside.' No words could make it
clearer that citizens of the United States, within the meaning of this article, must
be natural, and not artificial persons; for a corporation cannot be said to be born,
nor can it be naturalized. I am dear, therefore, that a corporate body is not a
citizen of the United States as that term is used in the 14th amendment.
Are corporations persons within the meaning of the same amendments? The
word 'person' occurs three times in the first section, in the following connections:
'All persons born or naturalized in the United States'-'nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty or property,' etc.-'nor' shall any state 'deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' The complainants
claim that this last clause applies to corporations-artificial persons. Only natural
persons can be born or naturalized; only natural persons can be deprived of life or
liberty, so that it is dear that artificial persons are excluded from the provisions of
the first two clauses just quoted. If we adopt the construction claimed by
complainants, we must hold that the word 'person,' where it occurs the third time
in this section, has a wider and more comprehensive meaning than in the other
clauses of the section where it occurs. This would be a construction for which we
find no warrant in the rules of interpretation. The plain and evident meaning of
the section is, that the persons to whom the equal protection of the law is secured
are persons born or naturalized or endowed with life and liberty, and consequently
natural and not artificial persons. This construction of the section is strengthened
by the history of the submission by congress, and the adoption by the states of the
126 U.S. CONST., amend. I. As well as, of course, impeding the free
exercise of religion, or
interfering with the right peacefully to assemble, or prohibiting the petitioning for a governmental
redress of grievances. See id.
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A. The Rise of the Corporation
During the late nineteenth century, a radical transformation took place in the
way in which American business was structured and operated. The most obvious
contrast involved the corporation's larger size and capitalization. Before the 1870s,
the typical business establishment was financed by a single person or by several
people bound together in a partnership. As a result, most businesses represented
the wealth of only a few individuals. Before the Civil War, almost all corporate
businesses were also owned and managed by the same people. Companies usually
involved only a few owners who oversaw all of a business's operations. To insure
honesty in a distant office, a merchant might staff it with a relative. As the
nineteenth century wore on, however, corporations began to expand.
One sweeping change in business operation was the corporation's increased size
and geographical scale. Before the 1880s, most firms operated in a single town
from a single office or factory.1 28 Most sales were made to customers in the
immediate area. 129 But the new corporate enterprises carried out their functions in
widely scattered locations. In 1900, General Electric had plants in twenty-three
cities.' By 1940, the company had factories in forty cities.'"' As corporations
expanded, the law was forced to determine what rights corporations should have
relative to those of ordinary citizens.13 2
In 1886, in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, the
Supreme Court, for the first time, announced that corporations were persons for
purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.13 The
announcement was made in a curious way; it was not included in the decision of
the Court. Indeed, the Court did not base its decision on constitutional grounds,
making the announcement of the personhood of corporations entirely irrelevant to
the decision. Instead this announcement of an important new constitutional
doctrine appears in the notes of the Court's reporter. His notes stated:
One of the points made and discussed at length in the brief of counsel for
defendants in error was that "Corporations are persons within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Before
argument Mr. Chief Justice Waite said: The court does not wish to hear
argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person within its
Ins. Co. v. City of New Orleans, 13 F. Cas. 67, 67-68 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 7052).
The Corporate Revolution, WWW.DIGITALHISTORY.UH.EDU (June 24, 2015), available at
http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/disptextbook.cfm?smtlD=2&psid=3166
129 Id.
130 Id.
127

128

1I

BERNARD GOROwITz, THE GENERAL ELECTRIC STORY: A HERITAGE OF INNOVATION,

1876-1999, at 129 (1999).
132 See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL & DALIA TSUK MITCHELL, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 3-5 (2d. 2012).
133 118 U.S. 394, 394-95 (1886) (mentioning the reporter's notes).
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jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are
all of opinion that it does."

Statements by a court that are related to the issue in the case, but not necessary
to its decision, are treated as dicta-utterances not entitled to the usual weight
accorded to precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis."' What, then, does one
call a statement made from the bench before oral argument that announces the
Court's view of an issue, which would be utterly irrelevant to its decision? This
"dicta-lite"was soon transformed into a holding. The corporation became a person
entitled to new liberty and equality under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The corporate "person" would soon become a centerpiece of constitutional doctrine
under which the Court could strike down social and economic legislation that it
found unreasonably interfered with the "rights" of the corporate "person."'
In 1897, in Gulf Colorado& Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Ellis, the Court squarely
held that a corporation was a person under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 7 This
time, the Court itself announced the holding, and it cited Santa Clara as the first
case in support of its decision: "It is well settled that corporations are persons
within the provisions of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment of the [C]onstitution of
the United States." 3 ' The case concerned a Texas statute that allowed the awarding
of costs and a ten-dollar attorney's fee to persons injured by a railroad company. 3 9
The attorney's fee only applied to plaintiffs who had claims worth fifty dollars or
less, who had provided the railroad notice of their claim and had the claim denied,
and who had won against the railroad in court.1 40 By a narrow five-to-four
majority, the Supreme Court held that Texas's law violated a corporation's right to
equal protection of the laws.1 41 The Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway did not
get a ten-dollar fee if it won, and it was the only "person" treated in this way.1 42
The case foreshadowed how the courts would begin to limit legislative power.' 43
By contrast, the dissenters in the Gulfcase took a realistic look at the difference
between the small claims of individual plaintiffs, who were often of limited means,
134

Id.

..sWILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 115-17 (2d ed. 2008).

.3. See generally, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
17 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897).
13 Id. (citing Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 394 (1886)).
13 Id. at 150-51.
14

Id.

Id. at 153.
Id.
143 By themselves, such claims would not amount to much. But when
aggregated, all of the small
claims could amount to a lot. If a corporation-here, the railroad-could convince all of the people with
small claims against the corporation that their claims would not be worth pursuing, the corporation
could actually save itself a substantial amount of money at the end of the day. Of course, it goes without
saying that the railroad and the small claimant were not similarly situated. One was far better able to
sustain the costs of litigation than the other. But for the Court, contrasting the economic power of the
two actors was seen as constitutionally impermissible. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1915),
overruledinpart byPhelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
141

142
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and large railroad corporations. These dissenters indulged in a presumption of
constitutionality:

.

The legislature of a state must be presumed to have acted from lawful motives,
unless the contrary appears upon the face of the statute. If, for instance, the
legislature of Texas was satisfied, from observation and experience, that railroad
corporations within the state were accustomed, beyond other corporations or
persons, to unconscionably resist the payment of such petty claims, with the
object of exhausting the patience and the means of the claimants, by prolonged
litigation, and perhaps repeated appeals, railroad corporations alone might well be
required, when ultimately defeated in a suit upon such a claim, to pay a moderate
attorney's fee, as a just, though often inadequate, contribution to the expenses to
which they had put the plaintiff in establishing a rightful demand. Whether such
a state of things as above supposed did in fact exist, and whether, for that or other
reasons, sound policy required the allowance of such a fee to either party, or to the
plaintiff only, were questions to be determined by the legislature . . .

As corporations began to play a greater role in society, legislatures began to
regulate.
B. The Lochner Era
In the closing decades of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the
twentieth, formalistic judicial reasoning that treated the freedom of the corporation
the same as the freedom of the individual became more common. In Pennsylvania
in the 1880s, for instance, the legislature had passed a state statute requiring
employers to pay their workers in legal tender, instead of providing them with a
scrip that could be redeemed at the company store or for company housing. 14 5 But
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down this statute as a violation of the
liberty of contract.14 6 From the 1890s through the 1930s, the Supreme Court often
struck down state and federal laws dealing with working conditions or protecting
the right of employees to join a union. 47 It also denied the federal government
power to ban from interstate commerce the transportation of goods manufactured
by little children.14 s Although the Court did not always side with corporations and
employers, it did so often, with a few notable exceptions.1 4 9
In 1905, in the famous case of Lochner v. New York, the Court considered
Gulf 165 U.S. at 167.
See Godcharles v. Wigeman, 6 A. 354, 357-56 (Pa. 1886).
146 See id. at 356.
147 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918), overruled in part by United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908), overruled in part by
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905),
overruledin partbyFerguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1965).
148 Dagenhart,247 U.S. at 273, 276.
149 Professor William E. Forbath has found a broad pattern of decisions hostile both to unions and
to protective labor laws for the average male worker. See generallyWILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND
144

145

THE SHAPING

OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT

influential in shaping the labor movement's outlook).

(1989) (illustrating how courts were
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whether to strike down a New York law that limited the hours that bakers could
work to sixty hours a week.so The Supreme Court cited the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court mentioned above with approval and distinguished another Supreme Court
case that cut the other way.' Curiously, under the Pennsylvania statute, a
corporation could use its power to limit employees' freedom of contract, greatly
limiting the employee's freedom to bargain with others for the necessities of life.
Moreover, as Justice John Marshall Harlan showed in his Lochner dissent, there
was very substantial evidence of serious occupational disease and early death among
bakers,152 a problem exacerbated by their long working hours. However, that was
not enough to save the law. The Supreme Court came to its own conclusions,
based not on treatises on occupational disease like those relied on by Harlan, but on
its assessment of what was deemed to be "common knowledge."s3
Since there was no contention that the bread baked by these New York bakers
was unsafe, the Court decided that public health was not an issue.s4 As to the
health of bakers, the Court said that it was not enough of a problem to justify New
15
York's legislation.s
Statutes "limiting the hours in which grown and intelligent
men may labor to earn their living," wrote the majority, were "mere meddlesome
5
interferences with the rights of the individual."s'
Since the Court found no
"reasonable ground[s]" of a danger to public or worker health, it ruled that New
York's statute violated the Due Process Clause.' The statute violated the liberty of
contract of an employer and its employee to agree on the hours that the employee
would work.'s There was "no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of
person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the
occupation of a baker."1 59
In 1915, in Coppage v. Kansas, the Court overturned a Kansas law that made it
a crime, as a condition of employment, to exact a promise from an employee not to
join a union or to remain in one.' The Kansas Supreme Court had originally
upheld this law, noting that "employees, as a rule, are not financially able to be as
independent in making contracts for the sale of their labor as are employers in
making contracts of purchase thereof."' 6 ' But the Court in Coppage rejected these
considerations. For it, the inequality of bargaining power was simply a natural and
inevitable result of private property and the freedom of contract. 16 2 Both the liberty
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 63.
Id. at 63-64.
152 Id. at 70-72 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 58-59.
154 Id. at 57.
150
151

155 Id.
156 Id. at 61.
157 Id. at 66.
15 See id. at 63-65.
15

1Id. at 57.
See genenlly Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), overruledin part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
'n

161 Id. at 17.
162 Id.
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of the individual and of the corporate person were protected by the Due Process
Clause.' The state could not decide that the public good required a "removal of
those inequalities" in wealth and power between the worker and the corporation.' 64
Limiting the power of the corporation to impose its ban on union membership
threatened both liberty and property.'
This is how the Supreme Court saw the world during the Lochner era. It
limited the government's attempts to regulate corporate power to safeguard the
health and welfare of male workers,16 6 and eventually of female workers too,6 7

under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
Likewise, the Supreme Court invoked its narrow reading of the Constitution's
Commerce Clause to void a federal law that sought to protect the right of workers
to join a union,16 8 and it later struck down a congressional statute that had banned
the interstate transportation of items manufactured through the labor of small
children.' 6 In addition to its Due Process, Equal Protection, and Commerce
Clause decisions, the Court began to take other steps to protect concentrated
wealth and power through legal avenues.1 70
Of course, in contrast to the jurisprudence of Supreme Court in the Lochner
era, Progressives of the time recognized the possibility of a different approach. For
example, the scholar Karl Popper, in his classic book The Open Society and Its
Enemies, rejected the idea that efforts to mitigate the effects of great economic
inequality were illegitimate limits on freedom:
Freedom ... defeats itself, if it is unlimited. Unlimited freedom means that a
strong man is free to bully one who is weak and to rob him of his freedom. This is
why we demand that the state should limit freedom to a certain extent, so that
everyone's freedom is protected by law. Nobody should be at the mercy of others,
but all should have a rightto be protected by the state.
Now ... these considerations, originally meant to apply to the realm of bruteforce, of physical intimidation, must be applied to the economic realm also. Even
if the state protects its citizens from being bullied by physical violence ... it may
defeat our ends by its failure to protect them from the misuse of economic power.
In such a state, the economically strong is free to bully one who is economically
weak, and to rob him of his freedom. [U]nlimited economic freedom can be just
as self-defeating as unlimited physical freedom, and economic power may be
nearly as dangerous as physical violence; for those who possess a surplus of food

'6

See id. at 17-22.
Id. at 17-18.

16

See id. at 19.

163

* See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1908).
167 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 262 U.S.525 (1925) (striking down a minimum wage for women
and children in the District of Columbia, overruled in part by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937).
"6 See generallyAdair v. United States, 201 U.S. 161 (1908), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
16 See generally Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled in part by United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
170 See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586-87 (1895), vacated on reargument
byPollockv. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
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can force those who are starving into a "freely accepted servitude, without using
violence . . . . [A]minority which is economically strong may in this way exploit
the majority of those who are economically weak."'

C. ProgressiveReforms
If the evolution of free speech was complicated by the rise of the corporation
and its corresponding concentration of wealth, one would expect the fine line
between these interests to be something that the courts would have to struggle
over. In a true ecology, the proportion of one species relative to the other ebbs and
flows, and true harm does not result until one species is able to overwhelm the rest.
In the 1930s and after, the Court and Congress made conscious decisions to
mitigate the harm to one species by the other and invented new doctrines to keep
their proportions in balance.
In the 1930s, the Supreme Court found that government-owned streets, parks,
and sidewalks were a public forum for free speech." 2 People had a free-speech
easement to use public property to speak, to assemble, and to hand out leaflets.'
This was a space for speech that included, but was not limited to, political speech.
The public forum was a place where people without lots of money, but who had
ideas and causes, could reach others.'17 4 It was a space for speech, and for diverse
speech too. Public forums enhanced the liberty of our citizenry and expanded the
democratic space available for free speech in the ecosystem.
Though the idea of a public forum was itself quite old, it sometimes got a
hostile judicial reception. In 1897, the Court affirmed a Massachusetts opinion by
Oliver Wendell Holmes holding that city-owned streets and parks were simply the
city's private property.' And just as homeowners could exclude speakers from their
lawns or living rooms, so the leaders of a city government could exclude speakers
from the city's property.77 The right to exclude also meant the city could pick and
choose among speakers; it followed that a city could decide if, and under what
circumstances, its property could be used for speech and assembly. Just as a
homeowner could decide whom to exclude from his house, the city could arbitrarily
allow some free speech while rejecting other kinds.'7 7 The Supreme Court
summarily affirmed this decision. It limited the freedom of speech in the
171 KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 124-125 (Routledge 5th ed.) (1966).

See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1943) ("Freedom to distribute information to
every citizen wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that,
putting aside reasonable police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be
fully preserved.").
174 See Schneider 308 U.S. at 163 ("[T]he streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination
of information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate
places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.").
Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895), affd Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43,
47 (1897).
176 See id.
172
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us

177 See id. For further discussion, see ROBERT L. TSAI, ELOQUENCE & REASON: CREATING A
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ecosystem.
It was not until the 1930s that the Supreme Court reversed course and began to
take a different view of the public forum. A city might technically own the land,
the Court said, but "[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.""' All people had a right to use these
public spaces for speech and assembly. The downtown business district, with its
crowds and public streets and public sidewalks, became a place where one could
reach people. In the political ecosystem, the Court protected an expanded public
space for free speech and for diverse views, and in the process expanded both
individual liberty and equality.
But what happens when the public space belongs to a corporation, instead of to
the government? In the late nineteenth century, corporations owned entire towns.
Streets, parks, homes, and business districts were owned by the corporation, in
what became known as "the company town.""' In 1946, the Supreme Court faced
the case of free speech and the free exercise of religion on the streets of such a
town. In Marsh v. Alabama, the Court held that a company that owned a town
could not exclude free speech from its streets, and that ownership did not allow the
company to impair channels of communication.'s The Court in Marsh decided
that basic principles of the freedom of expression did not let the state permit "a
corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental
liberties . . . ."'81
In Marsh, the Court, in effect, protected a space for democratic free speech and
dialogue against the claim of a corporation that it could exclude free speech as it
chose. It expanded the liberty of natural persons against the infringement of that
liberty by corporations. Speaking for a plurality of four, Justice Black took a
functional view of free speech. He noted that many citizens lived in company
towns.'8 2 The Court understood that within the ecosystem, a space for diverse
speech needed to be protected. Though the town legally belonged to a company, it
was, the Court noted, the functional equivalent of other towns that were run by the
government, and a place where streets, sidewalks, and parks should be protected for
purposes of democratic speech. As a result, individual free speech rights trumped
the company's claim to use its property as it wished.' With cases like Marsh, the
Supreme Court expanded the ecosystem to provide new spaces for diverse voices,
including those of people of limited financial means. Whether or not one agrees
with the decisions in Marsh or with the prior public forum cases, the key point is to
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
See, e.g., Bruce D. Snider, In Good Company: Company Towns Across the U.S., NAT'L
TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION (July 1, 2014), http://www.preservationnation.org/magazine/20
14/summer/in-good-company.html.
18o See generally, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
'st Id. at 509.
182 Id. at 508-09.
17s
179
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understand that they produced an expansive space for different points of view, and
that they ultimately protected the free speech of natural persons.
In another sense, the case of the public forum illustrates the complexity of the
ecology of the freedom of expression. As the ways in which society understood free
speech evolved, so did the ways that it dealt with the press. Much of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence of the mid-twentieth century illustrates this, pointing to the
struggles that the courts have had in regulating this evolving form of speech. For
example, the advent of a new press technology, the telegraph, rapidly transformed
itself into a privately held monopoly.184 The New York Associated Press, through
arrangements with the telegraph monopoly, managed to achieve an unrivaled
dominance over the dissemination of timely news, which it sent by telegraph to its
client newspapers.' These newspapers, in turn, were required to make the AP
their exclusive source of wire news and were allowed no alternative sources."' As
Paul Starr, a historian of the media, explains, the telegraph monopoly helped to
produce "'the first 'bilateral monopoly' in the United States-a monopoly telegraph
[working] in close partnership with a monopoly [wire] news service."
These monopolies soon influenced editorial policy. In the 1840s, there were
calls for telegraph wires to be taken over and controlled by the federal Post
Office.'" This would have preserved a free speech system that was open to all.
However, after the agreement between the AP and the telegraph monopoly, most
major newspapers opposed the takeover."' AP member newspapers were required
to use the AP's telegraph service exclusively, and newspapers that criticized the AP
or supported competing telegraph services risked losing their membership. 90
Moreover, no new papers could be admitted to the AP telegraph system without
the concurrence of all other newspapers in the area, and this blackball system
helped to protect local papers against competition.' 9' With time, a Lochner-like
liberty enhanced the power of the monopolies, while the liberty of the independent
newspapers contracted. Not until 1945 did the Supreme Court finally hold that the
AP's exclusive arrangements constituted an unlawful restraint of trade. 9 2 The
Court rejected the claim that press freedom protected the monopolistic
arrangements.' As Justice Hugo Black, in Associated Press v. United States,
noted:
It would be strange indeed however if the grave concern for freedom of the press
which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command
that the government was without power to protect that freedom. The First
STARR, supra note 86, at 175.
Id. at 185-86.
186 Id.
18

1ss

Id. at 175.
.'Id. at 177.
117

1"9 Id.

'9 Id. at 184.
191 Id.

192 See generalyAssociated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
19 See id. at 20.
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Amendment, far from providing an argument against application of the Sherman
Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary. That Amendment rests on
the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free
press is a condition of a free society. Surely a command that the government itself
shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental
combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally
guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means freedom for all and not for
94

some.1

On balance, this decision enhanced liberty and equality and expanded the space
for freedom of expression in the political ecosystem. But the battles over the
telegraph monopoly would soon be surpassed. The use of another technological
marvel, the telephone, was also on the rise, and it too risked becoming a monopoly.
However, unlike with the telegraph, the government stepped in to treat it as a
common carrier, requiring it to carry all messages without discrimination, thus
preserving a space for diverse speech."s
These stories of the private company town and the AP telegraph monopoly
should form a cautionary tale. For example, the Internet currently provides a large
forum for free speech.' 96 With a small monthly fee for access, the Internet is open
both to very diverse points of view and to poorly financed causes. Most poor people
access the Internet on the same terms as the wealthy. As a result, multiple
perspectives can be found there. Yet the Internet comes to us through "private"
cables and other "private" sources, and the owners of these cables, all corporations,
contend that they are their private property.9' Since, they say, the cables are their
private property, they may use them as they see fit-to transmit their content and
exclude or discriminate against the content of others.198 These corporations can set
pricing structures that make the Internet functionally unavailable to many less
well-financed public causes.' 99 Openness on the Internet will cease if the owners of
the cables are able to block criticism of their plans to appropriate the Internet or,
for that matter, block any other subject or perspective. 200
This is what the "net neutrality" debate is about. 2 0 1A space for free and diverse
speech could be made to disappear or contract. Such a change would degrade an
environment in which free ideas blossom. If the Internet were to be controlled or
influenced by a private party, it may limit both the medium that free speech
currently likes to inhabit and the freedoms of the inhabitants who may speak there.
To preserve space for robust democratic dialogue that is less dependent on the
19
195

Id.

See STARR, supra note 86, at 210.

196 See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).

See generally BEN SCoTT, MARK COOPER & JEANNINE KENNEY, WHY CONSUMERS
DEMAND INTERNET FREEDOM-NETWORK NEUTRALITY: FACT VS. FICTION 11, 19, 21 (May
2006), availableat http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/fp-legacy/nnfact vfiction-final.pdf.
197

198 Id.
199 Id.
200 Id.

201 See BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION (2012).
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whims of concentrated wealth, we need to preserve the Internet as a route to ensure
the equality of access for free speech. The recent decision of the FCC to regulate
broadband Internet service as a public utility was a promising step in the effort to
protect democratic spaces in our political ecology from corporate appropriation.2 0 2
D. The Modern Media Landscape
Corporations play a role in our political ecosystem-and they have for some
time. While corporate charters issued by the state give their existence to them and
they are not born like natural persons, from the perspective of the law they have
long been treated as fictitious persons. 203 Like natural persons, corporations can
borrow money, sue others, and be sued for the harms they cause. But in order to
coexist with natural persons, corporations were not given extraordinary and unique
access to one of the most important rights that natural persons have, the right to
vote. Nor were corporations given the right to dominate democratic speech.
Thanks to the Internet and modern communications, we continue to have a
diverse free speech system. But the Internet is threatened by the corporate powers
and interests of those companies that control the cables through which information
is disseminated. Today, the modern media-books, newspapers, television, cable,
the Internet, and the rest of it-is becoming consolidated into just a handful of
companies.204 Those who control these companies often have interests, such as
preserving corporate revenue or introducing corporate tax breaks. 205 Recently, our
jurisprudence has magnified the speech of corporations relative to the speech of
natural people in a way that allows wealthy interests to dominate more of what we
hear and see.
Part of the reason that corporations are increasingly able to influence speech is
because they now occupy a greater percentage of our ecosystem. The rise of
corporate speech has accelerated in tandem with another phenomenon that has
given corporations greater power: corporate consolidation. Consolidation ensures
not only that a corporation itself has more power, but that fewer and fewer
corporations do most of the speaking.206 In the free speech system today, the
202 Rebecca R. Ruiz & Steve Lohr, F.C.C. Votes to Regulate the Internet as a Utility, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 26, 2015) at Bl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/technology/net-neutrality
-fcc-vote-internet-utility.html?_r=0.
203 See, e.g., Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 154 (1897) (holding that a
corporation is a person under the Fourteenth Amendment).
204 BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY 27-54 (2004).
205 At least some media barons such as Rupert Murdoch also have an interest in an ever-greater
share of the media pie and in doing what they can to reduce other sources of news. See Arthur S.
Brisbane,
Covering Murdoch and
Company,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
29,
2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/opinion/19pubed.html (describing Mr. Murdoch's alliance with
the British Tories and his goal, shared by the new British Prime Minister, whose candidacy Mr.
Murdoch's newspapers supported, of weakening the BBC).
" See, e.g., Elizabeth Sanders, Freedom ofPress Challenged:Media Consolidation and Corporate
Control, FORDHAM U. (Feb. 2003), http://legacy.fordham.edu/campus-resources/enewsroom/insidefo
(noting
rdham/insidefordham_archi/20022003/february.2003/news/freedom-of-press-cha_9949.asp
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consolidation of our mass media has had an impact on what kinds of voices are
heard on television and radio, as well as on how and when individuals are able to
respond.2 07 Much of the mass media-books, film, radio, and television-is now
controlled by a few mega-corporations.20 8 The ownership of newspapers is
becoming grossly concentrated as well.209
These disturbing trends are coupled with the fact that media corporations tend
to have interlocking directors who often share common political aims. First and
foremost is advancing the economic interests of their companies.210 The whole
system produces a feedback loop. As Ben Bagdikian, a former journalism school
dean, explains, "the larger the media corporation, the greater its political influence,"
which, by persuading politicians to allow ever greater concentration, "produces a
still larger media corporation with still greater political power."21 ' Bagdikian argues
that corporate domination produces a media that is friendly to corporate owners
and advertisers and that gives little attention to progressive voices. Media barons
use their media power to favor politicians who, once they are reelected, in turn
support regulatory changes that expand the power of media companies that were
friendly to them. 21 2
Today, much of the nineteenth-century diversity that existed in the ownership
of the media-and the diverse perspectives that came with it-is gone. We now
live in a world where access to the media is crucial for political power, and where
those with wealth dominate television. This concentration of who is able to speak
can drown out unpopular voices, in effect stifling free speech and the values of the
free speech system as we once knew it.2 13 When corporations dominate the political
that "five conglomerates control[ ] more than 85 percent of what [can be] view[ed] on television").
207 See id.
208 See, e.g., Ashley Lutz, These 6 CorporationsControl 9096 of the Media in America, BUS.
INSIDER (June 14, 2012, 9:49AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/these-6-corporations-control-90
-of-the-media-in-america-2012-6.
209 See BAGDIKIAN, supra note 204, at 3-S. There are only a few major newspapers not owned by
the five or six dominant media companies. Among them are the New York Times, the Washington
Post, the Wal Street Journal, and the Los Angeles Times. See Jack Shafer, The Media MonotonyWho's Afraid of Time Warner, Viacom, Disney, Bertelsmannn, and News Corp.? Not Me., SLATE
(Aug. 4, 2004), http://www.slate.com/id/2104777. The consolidation of television and radio
programming is also a worrying trend, given how extremely influential these media are. The average
American watches approximately three hours of television a day, even with the Internet currently costing
less and being equally available. Economic News Release: American Time Use Survey Summary, U.S.
DEP'T. OF LABOR:
BUREAU OF LABOR STAT.
(June 18,
2014, 10:00 AM),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/atus.nr0.htm.
210 BAGDIKIAN, supra note 204, at 9.
211 Id. at 17; see also Brisbane, supra note 205.
212 BAGDIKIAN, supra note 204, at 25. Thus, in Britain, for example, Rupert Murdoch
first used his
media power to support Margaret Thatcher, who helped Murdoch overcome England's anti-monopoly
laws aimed at newspapers. Id. at 39. Later he switched from the Conservatives to Labor, supporting
Tony Blair and continuing to enjoy a favorable regulatory climate. Now Murdoch supports the
Conservatives again, especially since they have moved to cut the budget of his competitor, the British
Broadcasting Company or BBC. Id. at 304-15.
213 See generally BAGDIKIAN, supra note 204. Indeed, many people today rely on the Internet to
provide them some significant correction to the corporate stifling of speech that is otherwise transpiring
on the airwaves, even though much of what is found on the Internet comes from the major media
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ecosystem, they can place limits on the power of dissenters.214 Acting on their own,
corporate media companies will typically fail to broadcast stories about how their
economic interests conflict with the public interest.2 15
The above observations should raise serious concern about whether our free
speech system is strong and diverse enough to withstand further corporate
domination. If one accepts the dubious idea embraced in Citizens Untied that
corporations are persons or associations of persons joined for expressive purposes,
then the AP telegraph monopoly might have been protected under the speech,
press, association, and assembly guarantees of the First Amendment. Authoritative
selection would have triumphed over diversity. On balance, the result would have
served to restrict liberty as well as equality. Before Citizens United, there were laws
to limit the extent to which corporations could influence our politics and dominate
the political ecosystem. In only a few very limited circumstances were for-profit
corporations allowed to support or oppose political candidates for office.
Individuals or groups of individuals could act together to influence politics, but
corporations were prevented from overwhelming the democratic discussion. To
have it any other way would have tested and strained the biological diversity of our
free speech system. But when the Roberts Court arrived, the whole world changed.
IV. THE POLITICAL ECOSYSTEM GETS DISRUPTED

Corporate domination of our politics did not begin under the Roberts Court. In
1971 Lewis Powell, still a practicing lawyer, wrote a memo for the Chamber of
Commerce urging that since "the American economic system is under attack"
business must unite and "assiduously" cultivate political power.216 "Strength,"
Powell noted, "lies in organization, in careful long-range planning and an
implementation, in consistency of action . .. in the scale of financing available only
through joint effort. . . . "217 To this aim, businesses "massively increased political
giving" and organization. 218 Soon corporate executives and lobbyists began to dwarf
others in the political ecosystem. In the years that followed, even under, a
Democratic President and a Democratic Congress, business blocked most labor,
conglomerates, too. The Internet has provided a huge and diverse forum for free speech. But the
freedom of speech that people around the world find on the Internet can be destroyed by corporate
power too. Whether the Internet will survive efforts at corporate appropriation remains to be seen.
214 This was no different from the suppression of speech that occurred in private shopping malls just
a generation ago. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 507 (1976) (holding that individuals did
not have a right to handbill on "private" shopping center property).
25 See DEAN ALGER, MEGAMEDIA: How GIANT CORPORATIONS DOMINATE MASS MEDIA,
DISTORT COMPETITION, AND ENDANGER DEMOCRACY 100-11 (1998); see also Andrew Kohut,
Self-Censorship: Counting the Ways, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May/June 2000, at 42, 43 (noting
self-censorship by reporters to avoid offending corporate interests). On a host of other problems, see
generally Curtis, DemocraticIdeals, supra note 7.
216 JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: How WAHSINGTON
MADE THE RICH RICHER AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 117 (2011).
217 Id.
218 Id. at 121.
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consumer, environmental, and progressive initiatives.21 9 Jacob S. Hacker and Paul
Pierson suggest that increased business organization and funding of political causes,
following the course suggested by the Powell memorandum, began a process of
increased corporate domination of the political ecosystem.220 By 2010, the year that
Citizens United was decided, major American corporations, together with very
wealthy individuals, had greatly increased political influence. But, in spite of all
this, routes to reform still seemed constitutional. Now, however, let us return to the
winding road that led to the brave new world of the Roberts Court.
A. From the Beginning ofRegulation to Buckley
Ever since it passed the Tillman Act in 1907, Congress has attempted to
regulate the role of corporate money in the political ecosystem. 22 ' These regulations
have come in many different forms: bans on corporate spending, limits on
corporate contributions, requiring disclosure, and encouraging public financing.
Many of these methods have been aimed at reducing the influence that large
donations can have on officeholders. The Tillman Act, for instance, was passed
after the election of Theodore Roosevelt, after it turned out that Roosevelt received
seventy-three percent of the campaign contributions for his 1904 presidential
campaign from corporations. 222 For many decades, Congress recognized the
dangers of allowing corporations to influence elections. However, it did not always
choose to do something about it.
During the Watergate scandal, a congressional investigation uncovered
evidence of significant campaign irregularities in the funding of Richard Nixon's
Committee to Re-Elect the President ("CREEP"). 223 The problems involved
substantial unreported contributions to Nixon from wealthy corporations and
individuals.224 In response, in 1974, Congress passed major amendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 ("FECA"), which was until then the most
significant campaign finance law since the Tilman Act. FECA's 1974 amendments
placed new limits on campaign contributions and campaign expenditures. 2 25
Among other things, these amendments prohibited individuals from contributing
more than $1,000 to any single candidate, or more than $25,000 to all candidates
Id. at 126-132.
Id.
221 Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864-65 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a)
(2006)). The Tillman Act prohibited banks and corporations from contributing to political candidates
and parties. Id. In the 1940's, Congress prohibited labor unions from doing so as well. For background,
see ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND THE COURTS: THE MAKING OF FEDERAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 1-23 (1988).
222 Francis Bingham, Show Me the Money: Public Access and Accountability After Citizens
United, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1027, 1035 (2011).
223 See CANDICE J. NELSON, GRANT PARK: THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS 1968-2008, at 10 (2011).
224 See id.
225 Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-443, § 101(a)
-(e)(1), 88 Stat. 1263, 1263-65 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
2'
220
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in the aggregate, in a single election year.22 6
The constitutionality of FECA was challenged in Buckley v. Valeo, which until
Citizens United was the most important case in American campaign finance law. 227
In Buckley, the Court was first asked to determine whether FECA's $1,000 annual
limit on contributions to federal candidates violated the First Amendment. 228 One
of the most important holdings of the case was that limiting "corruption and the
appearance of corruption" was the only permissible justification for regulating
campaign contributions. 229 This justification for upholding contribution limits is
still good law today. The Court looked at whether FECA's $1,000 limit was closely
tailored to achieve the objective of preventing corruption or its appearance, and
found that it was. 230 Under exacting scrutiny, a compelling government interest was
served by the $1,000 limitation on contributions, with only "limited effect upon
First Amendment freedoms." 23' The Court also held that the $25,000 aggregate
ceiling on contributions was but a "modest restraint" that was aimed at preventing
232
the evasion of the $1,000 individual contribution limitations.
FECA's 1974 amendments also provided that "[n]o person may make any
expenditures .

.

. relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year

which . . . exceeds $1,000",233 In Buckley, the Court had to consider whether this
$1,000 limitation on expenditures was constitutional under the First Amendment
as well. For some, this provision was deeply troubling, since it limited both the
speech rights of politicians to inform their fellow citizens about their candidacies
and the right of the media to inform the public about different candidates. FECA,
in effect, prohibited many different kinds of speakers from voicing their views
"relative to a clearly identified candidate" through means that entail spending more
than $1,000 in a year.234 In distinguishing contribution and expenditure limits, the
Court held that the spending of money to influence the outcomes of a campaign, as
opposed to giving money to a political candidate, constituted a protected form of
Id. § 101(b)(1)-(3).
See generallyBuckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.), as recognized byMcConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
2' Id. at 12.
22
Id. at 25.
2 Id. at 28-9.
m Id. at 29.
232 Id. at 38. Interestingly, and relevant to the decision later in McCutcheon v. Federal Election
Commission, the Buckley Court stated that, in the context of the $25,000 overall contribution ceiling,
that "this quite modest restraint upon protected political activity serves to prevent evasion of the $1,000
contribution limitation by a person who might otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to a
particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to political committees likely to
contribute to that candidate, or huge contributions to the candidate's political party. The limited,
additional restriction on associational freedoms imposed by the overall ceiling is thus no more than a
corollary of the basic individual contribution limitation that we have found to be constitutionally valid."
26

227

Id.

23

Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443,

§ 101(b)(1), 88 Stat. 1263, 1265 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(1)).
_

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-40.
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free speech and did not pose the danger of corruption that contributions did."'
Based upon its finding that expenditure limits cannot be justified under the
rationale of preventing corruption, the Court applied heightened scrutiny to
them. 236

In addition to finding that a ban on "independent expenditures" substantially
burdened electoral speech without adequate justification, the Buckley Court also
considered some of the government's rationales for placing limits on campaign
activities-and it summarily rejected the rationale of regulating campaign finance
to promote equality among citizens. In a famous passage, the Court found that the
government's desire to restrict the speech of some members of society "in order to
enhance the relative voice of others"237 to be "wholly foreign to the First
Amendment."238 As such, it rejected the government's interest "in equalizing the
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections. "239
Justice Byron White dissented from the portion of the Court's decision dealing
with independent expenditures. He wrote:
The Court . .. accepts the congressional judgment that the evils of unlimited
contributions are sufficiently threatening to warrant restriction ....

.

The congressional judgment, which I would also accept, was that other steps must
be taken to counter the corrosive effects of money in federal election campaigns.
. . [As to the limit on independent expenditures] the Court strikes down the
provision, strangely enough claiming more insight as to what may improperly
influence candidates than is possessed by the majority of Congress that passed
this bill and the President who signed it.2 4

The Buckley Court also considered the constitutionality of public financing for
presidential elections.241 FECA had established a program for campaign funds to
be "designated by individual taxpayers . . . who on their income tax returns may
authorize the payment to the Fund of one dollar of their tax liability in the case of
an individual return or two dollars in the case of a joint return."24 2 Individual
taxpayers, in other words, could donate a dollar or two to a federal public financing
system, which the Supreme Court upheld under the First Amendment. 243 The
Court reasoned that the program is a "congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict,
or censor speech, but rather to use public money to facilitate and enlarge public
discussion and participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing
people. "244
235 Id. at 45.
236
237
238

239
240

241

Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 48-49.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 260-61 (White,
Id. at 90.

242 Id. at 86.
243
244

Id. at 92-93.
Id.

J., dissenting).
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Buckley deserves extensive discussion because of the impact it has had on the
development of campaign finance law. Most importantly, Buckley established that
limitations on campaign contributions could be upheld under the First
Amendment in an attempt to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption.
On the other hand, limits on campaign expenditures did not pose a risk of
corruption, and thus could not be sustained. The Court also upheld a public
financing system, which is important for our purposes. Most importantly, it
rejected "equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the
outcome of elections" as a legitimate governmental interest under the First
Amendment.24 5 Each of these holdings has had a major impact on how the
Supreme Court has analyzed campaign finance regulations since 1976, and each is
still being debated today.
B. Restricting CorporatePoliticalSpeech
Buckley only concerned the campaign contributions and expenditures of
individuals. The case said nothing about the role of corporations in the ecosystem.
Two years after Buckley, however, in 1978, the issue of whether corporations are
protected under the First Amendment when engaging in political speech came
before the Court in FirstNationalBank ofBoston v. Bellotti.246 A bank challenged
a Massachusetts statute that prevented corporations from using their corporate
treasury funds to influence voters to oppose a ballot initiative.247 The First National
Bank of Boston argued that there was no one to "corrupt" in such a situation, given
that no one was running for an office, and the Supreme Court agreed.24 8 The Court
held that "the corporate identity of the speaker" did not deprive "this proposed
speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection."249 The issue
was not whether corporations had free speech rights, but "whether [the law]
abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect." 2s0 The Court
emphasized the role of corporate speech in informing and educating the public.
The corporate speaker, the Court found, turning the idea of democratic free speech
on its head, "afford[s] the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination
of information and ideas." 2 51 In Bellotti, the corporate "person" was simply just
another speaker, and since this was a case about the state restriction on the
Id. at 48-49.
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
247 See generallyid.
248 Id. at 786-92. Justice Powell, a Nixon appointee, wrote the opinion for the majority. In private
practice he had drafted a memo for the Chamber of Commerce urging greater Chamber and corporate
activity to publicize the corporate perspective and suggesting more reliance on the courts to protect
corporate interests. Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. on Attack on American Free Enterprise
System to Mr. Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, Educ. Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Aug. 23,
1971), available athttp://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%2OArchives/PowellMemorandumTypescript
245
24

.pdf, see also GANS & KENDALL, supra note 78, at 47-48.
249

250

Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778.
Id. at 776.

" Id. at 783.
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"exposition of ideas," the law in question had to survive "exacting scrutiny."252
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts had argued that the statute was
supported by the compelling state interests of "preserving the integrity of the
electoral process, preventing corruption, and [sustaining] the active, alert
responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy" 25 3 The Court conceded that
these were interests of the highest importance. But, it said, the state's arguments all
hinged on the "assumption that such participation would exert an undue influence
on the outcome of a referendum vote, and-in the end-destroy the confidence of
the people in the democratic process and integrity of government." 254 The Supreme
Court was skeptical of Massachusetts' claim that corporations were "wealthy and
powerful and their views may drown out other points of view."255 Nonetheless, the
Court in Bellotti included a significant caveat in its decision: "If appellee's
arguments were supported by record or legislative findings that corporate advocacy
threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating
rather than serving First Amendment interests, these arguments would merit our
consideration.2 56 In this case, however, no such showing had been made.2 57
The Court's decision in Belotti allowing unlimited spending by for-profit
corporations on ballot measures should have provided a cautionary tale. In
concluding that speech cannot be deprived of First Amendment protection solely
because its source is a corporation, 258 Bellotti did not address how our political
ecosystem would change by allowing corporations to spend money to support or
oppose ballot measures. The record in Belotti simply did not address this question,
although human experience would suggest that when corporations decide their vital
financial interests are at stake, their message can be overwhelming, resulting in a
political monologue that hinders democratic free speech. The problem is that
corporations almost always have much more money than individuals do. Yet for
purposes of its First Amendment analysis, the Court in Belotti held that any law,
which restricts the political speech of a corporation, would be subject to "exacting
2 59
scrutiny"-and it struck down the Massachusetts statute.
How to treat corporate political speech remained unsettled for many years, as

252 Id. at 786.
253 Id. at 788-89

(alternation in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States
v. Int'l Union United Auto., Aircraft, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567,575 (1957)).
..
id. at 789.
255 id.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 789-90.
258 Id. at 784 ("We thus find no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in the decisions
of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be within the protection of the First
Amendment loses that protection simply because its source is a corporation . . . .").
259 Id. at 786 (holding that the constitutionality of the law restricting corporate speech turns on
whether it "can survive the exacting scrutiny necessitated by a state-imposed restriction of freedom of
speech. Especially where, as here, a prohibition is directed at speech itself, and the speech is intimately
related to the process of governing, 'the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest
which is compelling'") (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960))).
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two competing views of the issue began to emerge. 260 The first was that "political
speech [should] not lose First Amendment protection 'simply because its source is a
corporation."'261 The second found that because corporations have special
advantages that individual persons do not in accumulating wealth, it makes sense to
treat them differently than natural persons.2 62 While it was clear that speech made
by a corporation was protected under the First Amendment to some extent, 26 3 it
was far less clear how far that protection went.264 Corporations, after all, are not
natural persons. They are entities created by natural persons for the purpose of
accumulating wealth and given special advantages by the state. In his dissent in
Bellotti, Justice Rehnquist elaborated on this theme and quoted Chief Justice
Marshall from the famous Dartmouth College case:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those
properties which the charter of creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as
incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to
effect the object for which it was created.265

In dissent, Rehnquist dismissed the idea that the corporation contributed to the
democratic free speech system and that its speech needed to be constitutionally
protected. Rehnquist argued that a corporation's speech could be limited because it
was created for limited purposes by the state, while "[a]ll natural persons, who owe
their existence to a higher sovereign than the Commonwealth [of Massachusetts],
remain as free as before to engage in political activity." 2 66
Bellotti involved corporate expenditures on referenda, not expenditures to
support or oppose actual candidates who were running for office. In a footnote, the
Court had suggested that spending on political races would be a different matter. 267
The Court would get to address that difference in 1990, when it decided Austin v.
260 An exception, however, emerged for non-profit corporations.
Unlike for-profit corporations,
ideological corporations of a non-profit nature were held to have a First and Fourteenth Amendment
right to use their funds to advance political causes. See generally FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.
(MCFL), 479 U.S. 238 (1986). Such corporations had to be formed for the express purpose of
promoting political ideas, without engaging in business activities. Id. at 263-64. Also, they had to have
no shareholders or other persons to a claim assets or earnings. Id. And finally, they could not be
established by a business corporation or a labor union, and could not to accept contributions from such
entities. Id. This last requirement prevented such corporations from serving as conduits direct political
spending by for-profit corporation. Id.
261 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 98).
262 See id. at 350-51.
2 Id. at 342.
2" As the Supreme Court has made clear over the years, First Amendment protections are not
absolute. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) ("The protections afforded by the First
Amendment, however, are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government may regulate
certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.").
265 First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 823 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting
Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)).
266 Id. at 828.
267 Id. at 787 n.26.
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Michigan Chamber of Commerce and confronted a Michigan statute that banned
the use of corporate treasury finds to support actual candidatesfor public office. 2 68
In upholding the ban, the Court noted how the special state-conferred advantages
enjoyed by corporations, including their limited liability for shareholders and
unlimited corporate life, allowed corporations to amass enormous wealth. 26 9 This
wealth was not an indication of public (or even shareholder) support for the
political positions taken by corporate officers. The Court concluded that corporate
wealth can unfairly influence decisions of politicians on matters of public interest
when "deployed in the form of independent expenditures, just as it can when it
assumes the guise of political contributions."270
In short, the Supreme Court in Austin had no trouble in finding that the
special advantages enjoyed by corporations justified treating them differently.2 71
Justice Marshall recognized that "state-created advantages not only allow
corporations to play a dominant role in the Nation's economy, but also permit
them to use 'resources amassed in the economic marketplace' to obtain 'an unfair
advantage in the political marketplace.' 2 72 The Court also emphasized how a
corporation's resources were "not an indication of popular support for the
corporation's political ideas." 273 Rather, its corporate treasury represented the
economically motivated decisions of the shareholders and directors of that
corporation.2 74 Based on these considerations, the Court concluded that Michigan
had a compelling interest in restricting how much influence a corporation may have
over politics by using its general treasury fund. 275
The ban on corporations using their corporate treasuries to influence elections
does not mean that corporations did not play a role in our political ecosystem. In
fact, they did, but their role was circumscribed. Under FECA, corporations had
been provided with a method by which they could engage in political speech. If a
corporation wanted to influence political candidates, it was allowed to form a
"separate segregated fund," or what was commonly known as a PAC.276
Corporations could not fund these PACs from their treasuries, but the PACs could
accept contributions from employees, shareholders, and executives affiliated with
the corporation. 277 Corporate PACs were then free to make contributions to federal
candidates, as well as expenditures to influence campaigns. What PACs did in
practice was provide a mechanism for the individuals within a corporation to
268 See generally Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
269 Id. at 665.

Id. at 660.
Id. 658-59.
272 Id. at 659 (quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986)).
273 Id. (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258).
274 Id. (quoting MCFL, 479 U.S. at 258).
275 Id. at 658.
276 Id. at 660; see also Quick Answers to PAC Questions, FED. ELECTION
COMMISSION,
http://www.fec.gov/ans/answerspac.shtml (last visited May 18, 2015).
277 Id. at 669.
270
271
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organize to make political contributions.27 8
PACs provided corporations (and unions) a greater toehold in the political
ecosystem then they had ever had before. Given life by FECA, corporate PACs
spread rapidly. "By 1975," according to Adam Winkler, "there were over 600
corporate PACs."2 79 By the end of the 1970s, corporate and union PACs financed
approximately sixty percent of all federal campaign expenses.2 80
Forcing the corporation to act through a PAC and restricting its ability to
contribute directly to candidates-a restriction that is still in effect today-did not
solve the question of whether corporations could make "independent expenditures."
Buckley had allowed the government to regulate "express advocacy"-that is,
spending on political advertisements that specifically used words like "vote for" or
"vote against" a particular candidate. 281 However, as long as the advertisement did
not say "vote for John Doe" or expressly advocate for a particular candidate, a
corporation was not prevented from running it. 282 As a result, corporations and
others seeking to influence the political system began running what came to be
known as "sham issue ads."283 These were television or radio ads that were meant to
influence the viewer or listener's opinion of a political candidate without explicitly
telling him how to vote. 284
With the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA"), Congress tried
to solve the problem of sham issue ads and to close the issue ad loophole by
designing a new term of art, the "electioneering communication." 28 5 Congress
defined this as a broadcast, cable, or satellite communication referring to a specific
278 See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2102). Under 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C), a corporation's Political
Action
Committee was exempted from the general expenditure ban found in § 441b.
279 Adam Winkler, "OtherPeople's Money": Corporations,Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance
Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 934-35 (2004).
280 Id. at 935 (citing Edwin M. Epstein, The PAC Phenomenon:An Overview, 22 ARIZ. L. REV.
355, 356 (1980)).
281 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 & n.52 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.), as recognized byMcConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruledby Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

282 Id. at

283 See Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, TransparentElections After Citizens United, BRENNAN CTR.FOR
JUSTTICE 8 (2011), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Disclosure%20in%20the%
20States.pdf (noting that sham advertisements "avoid Bucklefs magic words").
284 See id.
285 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Star. 81 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). Another purpose of the statute was to close the so-called
"soft money" loophole that was being used to circumvent federal election contribution laws. See
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 93-94 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010). Before BCRA, individuals who had reached the maximum contribution limit to political
candidates that was allowed under FECA would then give money to political party committees. See id.
These funds were not subjected to limits and were known as "soft money." See id. In theory, these funds
were supposed to be used to promote party activities in the states, but a Federal Election Commission
ruling allowed these funds to be used for mixed purposes, including influencing federal elections. See id.
Thus when a donor hit his contribution limit but wanted to give more, he could still give to the party
and count on it to use that money to support his preferred candidate. See id.
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candidate for federal office that was run either within thirty days of a primary
election or within sixty days of the general election. BCRA specifically banned the
use of corporate and union treasuries to fund "electioneering communications."286
In 2003, in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court
upheld BCRA's ban on electioneering communications that were paid for with
corporate or union treasury funds. 87 After holding extensive hearings, Congress
determined that independent political ads really functioned like ads that directly
urged the election of a candidate, and that those who spent money on them were
later rewarded with special access and preferential consideration of their political
goals.28 8 This practice posed a grave danger of corruption. 2 9 The Court found that
Congress's focus on broadcast ads made sense. Campaign spending on inadequately
answered television and broadcast ads, in sufficient numbers, had the ability to
shape public opinion. 29 0 The Supreme Court also noted that the ability to form a
PAC for political contributions "provided corporations and unions with a
constitutionally sufficient opportunity to engage in express advocacy. This has been
this Court's unanimous view."291
PACs were, of course, a compromise of sorts. They allowed the corporation to
enter the political ecosystem, but not to the extent of drowning out individual
voices entirely, given that PACs were subject to $5,000 contribution limits to each
candidate per election. 29 2 The use of PACs also conveniently removed the thorny
issue of whether a corporation's political activities reflected the views of its
employees, executives, or shareholders. The Court in McConnell, after weighing
the evidence of how corporations were influencing democratic speech, took a
reasonable approach to protecting the political ecosystem. It realized that because
individuals do not have the advantages that corporations do when it comes to
organization and wealth accumulation, the political speech of corporations has to
be restricted so that it is only made through limited, special segregated funds. 293 In
this way, they would always be welcome to contribute to the political conversation,
but they would not be able to overwhelm it.
But the victory for speech in McConnell proved to be short lived. By 2007,
28 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act § 441b(c)(2).
287 McConnell, 540 U.S. at
93.
288

289
290

Id. at 153-54.
Id. at 97.
See e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE

NEW GILDED AGE 120 (2008) (demonstrating that campaign spending has had a "significant electoral
impact in presidential elections over the past half-century"); KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & PAUL
WALDMAN, THE PRESS EFFECT: POLITICIANS, JOURNALISTS, AND THE STORIES THAT SHAPE

THE POLITICAL WORLD 10-12 (2004) (giving the example of deceptive claims about a tobacco bill
were widely aired, the other perspective was not, and thus the tobacco industry's perspective were widely
believed to be true).
291 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 415 (2010) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,
203 (2003)).
292 See ContributionLimits 2013-14, FED. ELECTION COMM'N, http://www.fec.gov/pages/broch
ures/contriblimits.shtml (last visited May 18, 2015).
293 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at
93.
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when FederalElection Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life ("WRTL" 94 was
decided, the Court's composition had changed. William Rehnquist had been
replaced by John Roberts and Sandra Day O'Conner by Samuel Alito.295 In
WRTL, the new Roberts Court held that BCRA's ban on corporate-funded
electioneering communications could not be applied to certain ads.296 The Court
found that the ban could only apply to those ads which were the functional
equivalent of "express advocacy"-in other words, to ads for which there was "no
reasonable interpretation other than that as an appeal to vote for or against a
specific candidate."297 WRTL, in effect, created a major loophole in BCRA's ban
on the corporate financing of electioneering communications through corporate
treasury funds.29 8 Earlier, in Austin and McConnell, banning the use of corporate
expenditures to engage in political speech did not seem like a difficult problem for
the Court. But the Roberts Court began chipping away at the prior regime, and
when the Supreme Court revisited this ban in Citizens United, it came to a very
different conclusion on this issue.
C. The Citizens United Decision
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission concerned whether a small
media company, Citizens United, could run a documentary film called Hillary: The
Movie.299 Though Citizens United was a non-profit, it happened to accept funding
from for-profit corporations. During the 2008 primaries, Hillary: The Movie was
available in theaters and on DVD, but Citizens United also wished to distribute its
film through a cable television video-on-demand service within thirty days of a
primary election. This would have violated the ban on "electioneering
communications" created by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.3 00
The majority in Citizens United noted how BCRA banned speech in the
political process, speech that was at the very heart of the First Amendment.30 The
ban was aimed at selectively disadvantaging a certain class of speakers, namely
corporations.32 Though it was true that corporations could form PACs, the Court
found that inadequate, mainly because the corporation had a right to speak and
speaking through a PAC was not the same as the corporation doing the
speaking.303 Justice Kennedy did not think very much of the PAC as an alternative
method for the corporation to express its views. He found that "PACs are
551 U.S. 449 (2007).
The History of the Court: Supreme Court Appointments, SuP. CT. HIST. Soc'Y,
http://supremecourthistory.org/timelineSCOTUSAppointments.html (last visited May 18, 2015).
296 See generllyFECv. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 449
(2007).
297 Id. at 469.
218 Id. at 469-70.
2" See generalyCitizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
_o Id. at 321.
* Id. at 337.
32 See id. at 337.
13 See id. at 337-39.
294

295
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burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to administer and subject to extensive
regulations," 304 that "[a] PAC is a separate association from the corporation, "305 and
that because of their "onerous restrictions" PACs did not offer the corporation a
viable option to engage in political speech.30
Because BCRA operated at the heart of the First Amendment and kept
corporations from being able to engage in a form of political speech, the statute had
to be sustained by a compelling state interest.307 The "skyrocketing costs of political
campaigns" and preventing the wealthy from dominating the discussion were not
recognized constitutional interests.os The special advantages conferred on
corporations also could not prohibit corporate speech under the First
Amendment," and it was irrelevant whether that speech had "little or no
correlation" with the public interest.3 10 In holding that for-profit corporations have
a right to use their corporate treasury funds to broadcast "independent" ads to
support candidates for federal office, Citizens United in effect took the hole that
WRTL had made in the regime established by BCRA and sustained in McConnell
decision and blew that hole wide open. The Court overruled Austin and parts of
McConnell in striking down the section of BCRA that had banned the use of
corporate treasury funds to pay for electioneering communications. In the view of
the Court, Austin had impermissibly "permit[ted] the Government to ban the
political speech of millions of associations of citizens,""' citizens who happened to
be the shareholders of these corporations. In short, Citizens United created a First
Amendment right for for-profit corporations to use their corporate treasury funds
to support candidates for public office.
The Court also read Buckley as meaning that an interest in equality did not
justify banning the use of corporate treasury funds for supporting or opposing
candidates.312 Buckley stood for the proposition that the government could not seek
to equalize the influence of individuals and groups on the outcome of elections, and
the vast inequality between corporations and almost all natural persons was no
more significant than the inequality in speech between the wealthy and the poor.3 13
The possibility that some views had the potential to be overwhelmed by
better-funded ones was irrelevant. First Amendment "protections do not depend
on the speaker's financial ability to engage in public discussion." 314 As to corruption
Id. at 337.

3
305
6

Id.
Id. at 339.

307 See id. at 340.
301 Id. at 348-50.

' See id. at 351.
310
311

Id.
Id. at 354.

See id. at 356-57.
id.
314 Id. at 350 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976)
(per curiam), supersededby statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155,
116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.), as recognized by McConnell v.
FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
312

313 See
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or the appearance of corruption, the Court in Citizens United held that
"independent expenditures," such as those not coordinated with the candidate,
simply could not give rise to corruption or its appearance.3 1' As a result, there was
no compelling interest in banning them.
As a matter of law, the reasoning of Citizens United found that huge
"independent expenditures" on behalf of or in opposition to a candidate simply
cannot endanger the fiduciary duty of candidates to "the people.""' For the
majority of the Court, the issue was legal, not empirical. The majority noted, after
all, that twenty-six states did not ban independent expenditures by for-profit
corporations, and the government did not argue that these states had been
corrupted.' The majority also saw no reason to distinguish corporate persons from
other wealthy individuals who, of course, retained the right to spend on
independent expenditures, which are often designed to further the spender's
economic interest.

3 18

As a result of Citizens United, corporations can now exercise "their" free speech
rights to attack candidates with negative ads. Indeed, attack ads on hot-button
issues of no immediate business concern may be the best corporate strategy. A
corporation opposed to the tightened regulation of deep-water off-shore oil
drilling, for example, or to financial regulation might fund "independent" ads about
a senator or representative's vote against its interests. Or, worse still, the
corporation can contribute to a social welfare group, a so-called 501(c)(4)
organization, that will run the ad and conceal the identity of the corporate donor. 9
The basic problem with the reasoning of Citizens United was explained by the
Supreme Court in its 2003 decision in McConnell, parts of which Citizens United
overruled. 2 0 McConnell, in turn, quoted from an earlier Supreme Court case:
More than a century ago the "sober-minded Elihu Root" advocated legislation
s Id. at 359-60.
See id. at 311-12.
311 Id. at 357.
31s See, e.g., Jane Mayer, Covert Operations: The Billionaire Brothers Who are Waging a War
Against Obama, NEW YORKER, Aug. 30, 2010, at 44. The Koch billionaires gave millions of dollars to
non-profit groups that criticize environmental regulations and favor lower taxes for industry. Id at 50.
Additionally, the Koch brothers have lobbied and attempted to prevent the EPA from classifying
formaldehyde, a product their company produces large quantities of, as a "known carcinogen." Id. at 55.
The brothers fund groups that claim that evidence fails to show that human activity contributes to
global warming-a position useful to their fossil-fuel interests. See id at 51. In addition, the brothers
fund an influential think tank highly critical of EPA regulations that have been troublesome to them.
Id. at 50. Both the brothers and their corporate PACs make substantial political contributions. Id. at 49.
...
In addition to super PACs and other purely political organizations, a number of groups that have
organized under Section 504(c) of the Internal Revenue Code now routinely engage in independent
spending to influence the outcome of elections. These include social welfare organizations created under
Section 504(c)(4). While political contributions, including those from corporations, to super PACs need
to be disclosed, those that are given to 504(c)(4) organizations do not. However, as non-profit groups,
501(c)(4) organizations must have as their primary purpose something other than influencing elections
and must spend more than half of their time on other efforts. For an overview, see Richard Briffault,
Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REv. 1644 (2012).
320 540 U.S. 93, 115 (2003), overruledbyCitizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010).
36
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that would prohibit political contributions by corporations in order to prevent the
great aggregations of wealth, from using their corporate funds, directly or
indirectly, to elect legislators who would vote for their protection and the
advancement of their interests as against those of the public.321

Prior to Citizens United, the only case protecting non-media for-profit
corporate election speech was Bellotti.322 In that case, however, Justice Powell's
opinion did not assert that corporations have free speech rights. Instead, he relied
on the right of the public to receive information. 323 It was a right given to the
public for purposes of encouraging wise decision-making, but the domination of
discourse from one perspective is inconsistent with this right. Justice Powell
recognized that if evidence showed that corporate speech was undermining the
democratic process, there was basis for regulation. 324 A corporation's ability to
dominate the dialogue is not a constitutional right. As Harold A. Lloyd argues, not
only does the public have a right to information, but the public also has a
"Constitutional right to a functioning representative government. "325
One could embrace the metaphor of the "free market of ideas" and believe that
an unregulated market will always maximize the space for a diverse system of
democratic free speech. Sadly, the situation is more complicated. Some market
developments expand the ecology of diverse speech, and some contract it. Some
types of government regulation help the environment, while others do not. For
example, in early American history, the postal system, postal subsidies for
newspapers, and public education expanded the space for free speech and expanded
the number of those who could effectively speak.326 Those earlier developments
enhanced practical liberty.
When the law was changed in the past to allow corporations to set up political
action committees to which their members could "voluntarily" donate, corporate
political spending soared.327 Prior arrangements, including bundled contributions
from wealthy corporate officers, already provided enhanced access and influence.
Citizens Unitedonly exacerbated this.
Citizens United also influenced what has transpired in the states. The Montana
Supreme Court, for instance, upheld that state's century-old ban on corporate
spending in state elections. Distinguishing Citizens United, it reasoned that
Montana's 1912 Corrupt Practices Act "concerns Montana law, Montana elections
321 Id. at 115 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Int'l Union United
Auto., Aircraft, &Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567, 571 (1957)).
322 See generallyFirst Nat'1 Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
323 We owe this point to Harold A. Lloyd, who pointed out that the right involved should not be
the free-speech right of the corporation but that of the public to receive information, and suggested that
"the public also has a right to a functioning democracy" is a fact which could justify limits on this type of
corporate speech. Email from Harold Anthony Lloyd (Aug. 15, 2010) (on file with the authors); see
generally Harold Anthony Lloyd, A Right But Wrong Place: Righting and Rewriting Citizens United,
56 S.D. L. REv. 219 (2011) [hereinafter Lloyd, A Right But Wrong Place].
324 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789.
325 Lloyd, A Right But Wrong Place, supra note 323, at 236.
326 See STARR, supra note 86, at 228.

327

Winkler, supra note 279, at 927.
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and it arises from Montana history."32 s In Montana, an early twentieth-century
entrepreneur routinely bribed state judges to decide mineral-rights cases in his
favor.32 9 A Senate investigation "expressed horror" at the purchase of one of
Montana's United States Senate seats through bribery of state legislators and
decried the "general aura of corruption in Montana." 330 State historian Harry Fritz
found that Montana was vulnerable to the domination of its elections by
corporations. The Montana Supreme Court agreed. 33 ' To invoke Citizens United
to overturn the sparsely populated state's Corrupt Practices Act, the Montana
Supreme Court reasoned, would mutilate two cherished hallmarks of Montana's
elections: low advertising costs and the necessity of close interpersonal contact. 332
Citizens Uniteds implication that quid pro quo corruption is the only form of
electoral corruption that government has an interest in preventing was "simply
smoke and mirrors," noted the Montana court, for "experience teaches [us] that
money corrupts, and enough of it corrupts absolutely." 333 Nonetheless, the U.S.
Supreme Court overruled the Montana decision, thus officially extending the
holding of Citizens United to the states. 334
D. McCutcheon andAggregate ContributionLimits
One of the major tools used by Congress to regulate campaign finance that was
upheld in Buckley came in the form of individual contribution limits. Starting with
the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1971, Congress has set limitations on how
much money an individual could contribute to political causes. First, there were
base limits which restricted how much money a donor could give to a particular
candidate or committee. 33s This limit was set at $1,000 in 1974, and that amount
was upheld in Buckley." 6 It was then raised to $2,000 by BCRA and has been
adjusted for inflation every two years since, so that the individual contribution limit
is now $2,700. 11 But FECA also imposed an "aggregate limit" on how much a
32
8

W. Tradition P'ship v. Attorney Gen. of Mont., 271 P.3d 1, rev'd, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
Id. at 8 (quoting K. Ross TOOLE, MONTANA: AN UNCOMMON LAND 196-99,204 (1959)).
330 Id. (quoting K. Ross TOOLE, MONTANA: AN UNCOMMON LAND 186-94 (1959)).
331 Id. at 9, 11.
332 Id. at 10-11
13 Id. at 35 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
" Am. Tradition P'ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012). Originally, the Supreme Court
had issued a stay of the Montana Supreme Court's decision, pending the completion of the certiorari
process. In an accompanying statement, Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Breyer) fired a shot heard
round the blogosphere: "Montana's experience, and the experience elsewhere since this Court's decision
in Citizens United . .. make it exceedingly difficult to maintain that independent expenditures by
corporations 'do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.' A petition for writ of
certiorari will give the Court an opportunity to consider whether, in light of the huge sums currently
deployed to buy candidates' allegiance, Citizens Untied should continue to hold sway." Am. Tradition
Pship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 1307, 1307-08 (2012) (mem.) (citations omitted).
31s See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) (2012); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
3 See generallyBuckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
3'
See
Contribution Limits
for 2015-2016,
FED.
ELECTION
COMM'N,
http://www.fec.gov/pages/fecrecord/2015/february/contriblimits2Ol52016.shtmnl
(last visited May 18,
.
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donor could contribute to allcandidates and committees combined."' An aggregate
cap on total contributions of $25,000 was also upheld in Buckley."' And it then
stood for thirty-eight years.
In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, the Court was asked to
determine whether the aggregate limits placed on individual contributions violated
the First Amendment.340 Under BCRA, the aggregate limits permitted an
individual to contribute a total of $48,600 to federal candidates and a total of
$74,600 to other political committees.3 4 1 In total, an individual could contribute up
to $123,200 to candidate and non-candidate committees during each two-year
election cycle.3 42 While the base limits restricted how much money a donor could
give to a particular candidate, the aggregate limits operated to restrict to how many
total federal candidates a donor could contribute.34 3 In McCutcheon, however, the
Court struck down the aggregate limits on individual contributions.3 44 In Chief
Justice Roberts' view, the aggregate limits constituted a substantial burden on
protected expression.3 45 The Court found that aggregate limits "constitute an
outright ban on further contributions" once a donor reaches his individual
contribution limits, 34 6 and that they did not serve the purpose of preventing
circumvention of the base limits.3 47 It concluded that "the aggregate limits violate
the First Amendment because they are not 'closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of associational freedoms.
The decision in McCutcheon severely undermined the goals of campaign
finance. Justice Breyer, writing for the dissent, summarized the decision as follows:
It understates the importance of protecting the political integrity of our
governmental institutions. It creates a loophole that will allow a single individual
to contribute millions of dollars to a political party or to a candidate's campaign.
Taken together with Citizens United ...today's decision eviscerates our Nation's
campaign finance laws, leaving a remnant incapable of dealing with the grave
problems of democratic legitimacy that those laws were intended to resolve.M 9
2015).
.. § 441a(a)(3); see also McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442.
33 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38.
o McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442.
341 Id.
342 Id. at 1443.
343 Id.
344 Id. at 1446, 1456.
3" See id. at 1448. Chief Justice Roberts discussed how the Court cannot agree with the Buckley
case that the aggregate limitations are a "modest restraint" on protected activity. Id. In the majority's
view, "[a]n aggregate limit on how many candidates and committees an individual may support through
contributions is not a 'modest restraint' at all." Id. The government may no more restrict how many
candidates or causes a donor may support than it may tell a newspaper how many candidates it may
endorse." Id.
` Id. at 1448.
347 Id. at 1452. This conclusion is particularly interesting when one considers the holding of
Buckley, where the Court held that aggregate contribution limits were only a "modest restraint"
intended to prevent circumvention of the base limits, and thus corruption, and upheld them.
" Id. at 1456 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
39 Id. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Justice Breyer's dissent notes that the plurality in McCutcheon misunderstood
the importance of the constitutional issues at stake.3 10 Chief Justice Roberts placed
too much weight on the First Amendment rights of individuals to make political
contributions, and too little weight on the governmental interest of maintaining the
integrity of the political ecosystem.s' There are two important constitutional
interests at stake in limiting aggregate contributions. First, there is the First
Amendment interest of donors who wish to contribute money to as many
candidates as they please. Second, there is the government's interest in maintaining
the integrity of the political system. Whereas the Supreme Court was once
concerned with the ability of Congress to pass laws intended to maintain the
integrity of our political system, under Citizens United and McCutcheon it has
shifted to protecting the interests of donors.35 2
But the governmental interest in protecting the integrity of the democratic
system must trump the burdens that are placed on donors by individual
contribution limits. Removing the aggregate individual contribution limit allows
rich donors to contribute as much as $3.6 million to all candidates and
committees. 3 That number is a lot higher than $123,200. It does not take a lot of
imagination to see that a candidate, once elected, might be influenced by those who
contribute the most to his campaign efforts. If a donor can give to as many
candidates as he wishes, he can influence many more candidates. This is exactly
what Congress was attempting to avoid when it first decided to establish aggregate
limitations on individual contributions. To the extent that Citizens United served
to provide for-profit corporations a greater role in politics, McCutcheon did largely
the same thing for our nation's very wealthy individuals.
E. Davis and the Millionaire'sAmendment
Providing funding for political campaigns, a practice that was specifically
upheld in Buckley, is another area where the government's interest in protecting
the integrity of the political ecosystem should trump competing concerns. For
many years, public financing was used for presidential campaigns, and various
350

I1d.

35

Id.

352 See id. at 1434 (holding that the "statutory aggregate limits on how much money a donor may

contribute in total to all political candidates or committees violates the First Amendment"); see also
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010) (holding that a "federal statute barring independent
corporate expenditures for electioneering communications violated the First Amendment").
3s3 Id. at 1472-76 (Breyer, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Breyer discusses examples of how
removing the aggregate individual contribution limit will affect the amount of money rich donors may
contribute. See id. at 1472-75. Since there are now no limit on the number of candidates or committees
one can support, a donor could give about $1.2 million dollars to a "Joint Party Committee" who could
then spend the money as it pleased, or transfer it to a specific candidate. Id. at 1472-73. Currently under
federal election law, a single contributor can give $5,200 to each party candidate over a two-year
electoral cycle. Id. at 1473. Thus, because there are 435 party candidates and 33 party candidates for
House and Senate seats respectively each cycle, without an aggregate limit a single donor can contribute
a total of $3.6 million over a two-year election cycle. Id.
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public financing systems proliferated in the states.3 S4 In Buckley, the Court
approved the practice of funding presidential campaigns from general revenues that
were to be funded by individual taxpayers in an income-tax check off.3 ss
But in 2008, when it decided Davis v. Federal Election Commission,35 6 the
Roberts Court harmed a nascent public funding movement. The matter in Davis
did not, technically, concern a public financing scheme. Rather, at issue in Davis
was the constitutionality of a section of BCRA dubbed the "Millionaire's
Amendment."s' It provided that once a candidate for federal office spent more
than $350,000 of his own money, his opponent would be allowed to receive three
times the normal limit in individual campaign contributions.ss The candidate who
spent the $350,000 would still be subject to regular contribution limits, however.
The law was designed to protect a candidate of modest wealth who was opposed by
a wealthy candidate, where the wealthy candidate was spending large sums of his
own money. In other words, a candidate facing a self-financed millionaire could
raise up to $6,900 per contributor rather than the then-limit of $2,300-but only
up to the point he matched the wealthy candidate.3 59
It was not long before this provision was challenged on free speech grounds by a
plaintiff named Jack Davis. In a prior campaign, Davis had spent $1.2 million,
most of it from his own funds.3 60 He lost to the incumbent, who incidentally had
not taken advantage of the increased fundraising limits. Davis was fined, however,
for his failure to comply with the disclosure rules that were in place to enforce the
Millionaire's Amendment.' In 2006, Davis wanted to run again and to spend
substantially from his own funds, but fearing that his opponent would have an
easier time responding, he challenged the Millionaire's Amendment.3 6 2
In Davis, the Court held that the "Millionaires Amendment" violated the First
Amendment.3 63 The majority held that the law imposes "different contribution
limits for candidates who are competing against each other" and impermissibly
burdens the First Amendment rights of those subject to the lower contribution
limit.364 The Court also noted, though, that if the contribution limits had been
applied across the board, there would be no constitutional problem. 65 Thus, under
354 See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, The Brief Historyof "Voter-Owned Elections"in Portland, Oregon:If
Public FinancingCan't Make It There, Can It Make It Anywhere?, 49 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 637
(2013).
3ss Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 86, 91-92 (1976) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of the U.S.C.), as recognized by McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
356 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
.s' See generallyid
.s. Id. at 729.

id.
Id. at 731.
361 Id. at 731-32.
362 Id. at 732.
363 Id. at 738.
3 Id.
361 Id. at 737.
359
3
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Davis, any campaign finance laws that subject competing candidates to different
contribution limits are deemed to be unconstitutional.
The Court found that the "Millionaire's Amendment" burdened a wealthy
person's First Amendment rights. By increasing the opportunity for a less-well-off
candidate to offer counter-speech, the fundraising assistance given to the less
well-financed candidate produces a "drag" on the wealthier candidate's right to
spend his own money."' The threat of being answered with the help of increased
contributions had a chilling effect, reasoned the majority. It held that speech was
being impermissibly chilled by the risk of counter-speech. If in Buckley the Court
struck down limits on how much a candidate could spend of his own money
because it reasoned that such spending did not involve a risk of
corruption. 367-after all, an individual could not corrupt himself-then in Davis the
Court struck down a statute that allowed a candidate who was facing self-financed
opponents to receive more contributions because it reasoned that this would force
the wealthy candidate to think twice before spending his own money. 61
The Court rejected the government's main justification for the statute, which
was to "level electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal wealth"3 69
Here, of course, that leveling was "leveling up" by providing more speech, rather
than leveling down. But the majority insisted that "[o]ur prior decisions . . . provide

no support for the proposition that this is a legitimate government objective."3 70
The only recognized objectives were preventing corruption and its appearance. The
government had justified its law as one that deals with the "natural advantage" that
a millionaire would otherwise have, but in response the Court quoted this
argument and italicized the words "natural advantage."371 In other words, just as the
Lochner Court saw the economic power of the corporation as compared to the lone
worker as a "natural" product of liberty, so the Davis Court similarly saw the
political advantages of the wealthy over the poor as "natural." For the majority,
even partially equalizing the opportunity of candidates to reach voters, not by
limiting Davis's speech but by potentially allowing his opponent a greater
opportunity to respond, was found to be unconstitutional and impermissible.
In dissent, Justice Stevens found that "the twin rationales at the heart of the
Millionaire's Amendment-reducing the importance of wealth as a criterion for
public office and countering the perception that seats in the United States
Congress are available for purchase by the wealthiest bidder-are important

166 Id. at 739 ("[T]he vigorous exercise of the right to use personal funds to finance
campaign
speech produces fundraising advantages for opponents in the competitive context of electoral politics...
. The resulting drag on First Amendment rights is not constitutional simply because it attaches as a
consequence of a statutorily imposed choice.").
367 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976).
368 Davis, 554 U.S. at 744.
" Id. at 741 (quoting Brief for Respondent-Appellee, Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) No.
07-320, 2008 WL 742921, at *34).

37

Id.

371

Id.
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governmental interests."372 He and the other dissenters denied that Davis could
show that the Millionaire's Amendment "causes him-or any other self-funding
candidate-any First Amendment injury whatsoever."" As Stevens wrote:
The Millionaire's Amendment quiets no speech at all. On the contrary, it does no
more than assist the opponent of a self-funding candidate in his attempts to make
his voice heard; this amplification in no way mutes the voice of the millionaire,
who remains able to speak as loud and as long as he likes in support of his
campaign. Enhancing the speech of the millionaire's opponent, far from
contravening the First Amendment, actually advances its core principles. If only
one candidate can make himself heard, the voter's ability to make an informed
choice is impaired.

374

Justice Stevens quoted Red Lion Broadcasting, the case that upheld a right to
reply under the now-defunct Fairness Doctrine: "[I]t is the purpose of the First
Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market." 375
to allow disparities of wealth to
Indeed, said the dissent, "'there is no good reason
3 76
be translated into disparities in political power."'

The majority regarded the millionaire's advantage, his wealth, and the
translation of wealth into political power as natural.3 " But the acquisition of great
wealth is not at all natural like the weather. It is quite often the result of laws, rules,
and governmental decisions. As Charles Lindblom explains in his book, The
Market System:378

Market systems require two sets of decisions or determinations. One set consists
of market transactions. The other consists of those "prior" determinations of the
distribution among people of assets and skills that are then offered in market
transactions. These prior determinations come from custom, law, and historical
accident; and they are largely compulsory ....
Market transactions cannot be undertaken until these prior determinations have
been made. Market transactions do not start from scratch. Until it has been
somehow decided, by custom and law on property, that certain assets are yours,
you cannot offer them in the market. . . . What each of us inherits, aside from
genetic factors, is in large part shaped by a long, long history of war, conquest,
7
looting, deceit, and intimidation, and law on property and inheritance."

Great fortunes are often produced or enhanced by governmental decisions and
J., dissenting).
...
Id. at 753 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
* Id. at 753-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 755-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969)).
376 Id. at 756-57 (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, PoliticalEquality and Unintended Consequences, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1390, 1393 (1994)).
3n Id. at 758.
17 See generally LINDBLOM, supra note 11.
1 Id. at 169-71.
372 Id. at 752-53 (Stevens,
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special favors.3 so
Though Davis was not a public financing case, one promising response to the

domination of the political system by wealthy and corporate interests would seem
to be public financing. But the truth is that few candidates are willing to accept
public financing without being offered "catch-up funds" to protect them against the
far greater spending of an opt-out candidate or from a third party's independent
expenditures, both of which might dwarf their speech. As a result, a number of
states passed public financing laws with such catch-up provisions. North Carolina,
for example, implemented such an approach for judicial elections, seeking to
minimize the need for judicial candidates to seek funds from those likely to benefit
from their decisions."' Arizona 8 2 and Maine"' had similar laws on the books for
their citizens who sought public office.
After Davis, however, public financing laws were placed in jeopardy by the
Court's doctrine that the fear of a response to the wealthy candidate's speech has an
impermissible chilling effect. Indeed, the Supreme Court, in the middle of the
election cycle, stayed, and later voided, portions of an Arizona public financing law
with a similar provision."' Before Davis, the First Circuit had already rejected a
challenge to a Maine statute with a "catch-up" provision.385 As the First Circuit
explained about the workings of that law:
In addition to the initial disbursement [of the amount allowed to participating
and qualifying candidates for public finance], a participating candidate receives a
dollar-for-dollar match of any monies raised by a non-participating opponent ...
. Matching funds are also provided to correspond to "independent expenditures,"
outlays made by an independent entity endorsing the participant's defeat or the
non-participating opponent's election. Once the participating candidate has
received double the initial distribution in matching funds, however, the matching
funds cease."'

This was so no matter how much additional money was raised by the
non-participating opponent. The plaintiffs below had challenged the matching
provision on the ground that it chilled and punished the speech of
non-participating candidates and those wishing to make independent expenditures
on behalf of a candidate. 8 But the First Circuit thought this claim
[M]isconstrue[s] the meaning of the First Amendment's protection of their
speech. They have no right to speak free from response-the purpose of the First
380 See generallyKEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY (2002).
:"I N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163-278.61 (West 2012) (repealed 2013).
382 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-940 (2015).
" ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 1124 (2014).
384 Adam Liptak, Court Puts Hold on Arizona's Campaign Fund, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2010, 1:26
PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/08/court-puts-hold-on-arizonas-campaign-fund.
385 See generallyDaggett v. Comm'n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 205 F.3d 445
(1st Cir. 2000).
38 Id. at 451 (citations omitted).
387 Id. at 464.
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Amendment is to secure the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources. [T]here exists no right to speak "free from
vigorous debate." The public funding system in no way limits the quantity of
speech one can engage in or the amount of money one can spend engaging in
political speech. . .

The Supreme Court in Davis did not cite this First Circuit decision, but it did
cite an Eighth Circuit opinion that had adopted a rationale similar to that in
Davis.5' That Eighth Circuit opinion struck down a Minnesota law that increased
the amount of money a participating candidate could raise to respond to
independent expenditures."' The First Circuit in the Maine case had refused to
follow the Eighth Circuit: "We cannot adopt the logic . . . which equates

responsive speech with an impairment to the initial speaker."3 9' Yet that was the
rationale followed in Davis.39 ' Ultimately, while Davis did not deal directly with
public financing, it did affect the way in which the Court looked at "trigger fund
provisions."" And sure enough, a few years later, in Arizona Free Enterprise
Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, decided in 2011, the Court struck down an
94
Arizona public financing statute similar to the one in Maine.3

F. Arizona Free Enterprise and Public Financing

Citizens in Arizona had passed the Arizona Citizens Clean Election Act in
response to one of that state's largest corruption scandals.395 This scandal involved
the "near-routine purchase of legislators' votes." ' 6 Before passing its new law,
Arizona had established campaign contribution limits through ballot initiative.
However, just five years after the enactment of these limits, the state suffered a
scandal where "10% of the State's legislators were caught accepting campaign
contributions or bribes in exchange for supporting a piece of legislation." 7 Against
this backdrop of corruption, Arizona voters again acted through ballot initiative to
fix their corrupt political system. 9 8 The solution attempted to deal with the state's
corrupt politics by targeting the use of large amounts of money to obtain political
influence.
The Arizona Citizens Clean Election Act guaranteed any candidate running for'
office in Arizona public funding.399 To qualify, a candidate had to raise a base
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994).
310 Id. at 1359-62.
39' Daggett, 205 F.3d at 465.
392 See generaily Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008).
31 Glenn Hudson, Comment, Think Smalf: The Future of Public Financing after Arizona Free
Enterprise, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 413, 420 (2012).
31 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
395 Id. at 2832.
396 Id. at 2845 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 2832.
398 id.
399 Id. at 2842.
3
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amount in small contributions from a set number of contributors. The candidate
was then entitled to financing, as were any opponents who also qualified.4 00 Any
candidate who elected to receive public financing was given an initial lump sum for
his campaign.4 01Alternatively, a candidate could also forego public funding and run
using his own private money.40 2 However, if the privately funded candidate spent in
excess of the publically-funded candidate's initial state allotment, the "matching
funds" provision of the law was triggered,40 3 and the state would provide the
publicly-financed candidate with roughly one dollar for every dollar that was spent
by the privately funded candidate above the publically-financed candidate's initial
allotment.404
In total, the publicly-financed candidate was entitled to up to double the
original amount he received in "catch-up" funds. In no case was the publicly
financed candidate entitled to more than twice the initial amount. Thus there was
also a cap placed on the matching funds provision where the publicly funded
candidate would stop receiving extra money.40 s The rule also applied if the publicly
financed candidate was attacked, or if his privately financed opponent was
supported by an outside group. However, a lawsuit was brought by
privately-financed candidates who argued that the law substantially burdened their
First Amendment rights.406
Citing Davis, the Court found Arizona's law to be in violation of the First (and
Fourteenth) Amendments.40 7 Chief Justice Roberts found that the law placed a
"restriction" on speech and constituted a "substantial burden" on First Amendment
rights.400 Arizona's law, he wrote, was not sufficiently tailored to achieve the
compelling interest of removing corruption or the appearance of corruption.4 09 As
he saw it, there were two major First Amendment problems. First, "a candidate or
independent group might not spend money if the direct result of that spending is
additional funding to political adversaries."410 The majority cited cases since Davis
holding that "matching funds impose 'a substantial burden on the exercise of First
Amendment rights,'"411 create "potential chilling effects,"412 and clearly "infringe on
40

Id.

a' Id. at 2832.
Id. at 2813-14.
Id. at 2814-15.
4
Id. at 2815-16.
405 Id.
406 Id. at 2816. One very interesting aspect of this case is the argument made by the petitioners. As
Justice Kagan so finely put it, "they are making a novel argument: that Arizona violated their First
Amendment rights by disbursing funds to other speakers even though they could have received (but
chose to spurn) the same financial assistance. Some people might call that chutzpah." Id. at 2835
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
* See id. at 2828.
See id. at 2818 (discussing how the Arizona law "plainly forces the privately financed candidate
to 'shoulder a special and potentially significant burden' when choosing to exercise his First Amendment
right to spend funds on behalf of his candidacy").
* See id. at 2826.
4
10 Id. at 2823.
4
Id. at 2823(quoting Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 213, 242 (2d Cir. 2010)).
402
4

a
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protected speech because of the chilling effect."41 3 Second, as to the claim that the
speech of the privately financed candidate was essentially untrammeled and
remained effective, the Court had this response: "All else being equal, an
advertisement supporting the election of a candidate that goes without a response is
often more effective than an advertisement that is directly controverted."414
Because the majority treated the matching-funds provision, which provided for
some responsive speech, as a substantial and chilling burden on the freedom of
speech of privately financed candidates and independent groups, the provision had
to be supported by a compelling state interest. The majority concluded that the
statute was designed to level the playing field in terms of campaign resources and
that this interest had been rejected in Buckley and Citizens United: "We have
repeatedly rejected the argument that the government has a compelling state
interest in 'leveling the playing field' that can justify undue burdens on political
speech."41 5 Indeed, the Court seemed to go further and to suggest that leveling the
playing field was actually constitutionally impermissible. For political speech, "the
guiding principle is freedom-the 'unfettered interchange of ideas.'"416 Alas, in the
view of the Roberts Court, more speech and more responsive speech was
inconsistent with "unfettered interchange of ideas." For the Roberts Court, it is
natural and unfettered if one side has the ability to buy large amounts of speech
through media advertisements and the other does not. The position of the Robert
Court, in this sense, is remarkably analogous to the view of the Lochner Court that
the inequality in bargaining power between a corporation and a lone unorganized
worker was simply natural, and that efforts to equalize the bargaining power
between those parties were unconstitutional.
More is at stake in the Court's approach to campaign finance than leveling the
playing field, of course. The crucial right of the public to hear both sides of a
controversy before making a decision is at stake. The ability to craft a workable
system of public financing to respond to the massive legal corruption of our
political system is at stake, too. Indeed, in dissent, Justice Kagan explained why
matching funds were crucial to successful public financing.417 For Kagan,
corruption was the central issue:
Campaign finance reform over the last century has focused on one key question:
how to prevent massive pools of private money from corrupting our political
system. If an office holder owes his election to wealthy contributors, he may act
418
for their benefit alone, rather than on behalf of all the people.

412 Id. (quoting McComish v. Bennett, 611 F.3d 510, 524 (9th Cit. 2010), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2806
(2011)).
413 Id. 2823-24 (citing Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
414 Id. at 2824.
Id. at 2825 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
416 Id. at 2826.
417 Id. at 2831-33 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
418 Id. at 2830 (Kagan,
J., dissenting).
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The dissent, indeed, focused on why Arizona's voters had adopted public
financing specifically by referendum. After efforts to limit the amount of
contributions had been adopted previously by statute, the state still went on to
suffer the worst bribery scandal in its history.419
The dissent also rejected the majority's characterization of the Arizona public
financing law as a restriction on speech. As to that,
There is just one problem. Arizona's matching funds provision does not restrict,
but instead subsidizes, speech. . . . The statute does not tell candidates or their
supporters how much money they can spend to convey their message, when they
can spend it, or what they can spend it on. Rather, the Arizona law, like the
public financing statute in Buckley, provides funding for political speech, thus
"facilitat[ing] communication by candidates with the electorate." By enabling
participating candidates to respond to their opponents' expression, the statute
expands public debate, in adherence to 'our tradition that more speech, not less, is
the governing rule.'"42

For the dissent, the law did not discriminate against particular ideas. The
system was open to all.421
[The First] Amendment protects no person's, nor any candidate's, 'right to be free
from vigorous debate.' Indeed, the Amendment exists so that this debate can
occur-robust, forceful, and contested. It is the theory of the Free Speech Clause
that 'falsehood and fallacies' are exposed through 'discussion,' 'education,' and
'more speech.'422

If nothing else, Arizona Free Enterprise exposed the conflicting constitutional
values that the Court has fought over in campaign finance. While the majority
insisted that Arizona's real interest was leveling the playing field, the dissent
responded by claiming that "the Court has no basis to question the sincerity of the
State's interest in rooting out political corruption. "423 In the end, the majority
simply failed to understand why the Arizona law was a legitimate attempt to
combat corruption in politics-and why the law encouraged free speech, as
opposed to burdening it. There was, after all, a cap placed on public funding, not
private funding. 4 24 Thus, once the privately funded candidate spent a certain
amount of money, the publicly funded candidate would stop receiving matching
funds. 42 5 This provision worked to ensure that Arizona's citizens would be
subjected to diverse speech, but it ensured this within limits. More importantly,
there was no burden being placed on the private funding of campaigns. The
Id. at 2832 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
420 Id. at 2833-34 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
421 Id. at 2834 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
422 Id. at 2835 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (citing Whitney v. California,
274 U.S.
357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
423 Id. at 2843 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
4
Id. at 2832 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
425 Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).
419

2014-2015]

CAMPAIGN FINANCE

585

privately-funded candidate could spend as much as he pleased.426
G. Quid Pro Quo Corruption
The ballot initiative at issue in Arizona should have been upheld for combating
corruption. But how the Supreme Court defines the term "corruption" has
narrowed under the Roberts Court. Since Buckley, campaign finance regulations
have been justified by the government's interest "in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption." 42 7 Without providing a precise definition of what
corruption entailed, the Court in Buckley originally treated it as something akin to
bribery. It reasoned that corruption occurred when "large contributions are given to
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders."4 28 In this
regard, corruption was likened to a payoff-the trading of votes for monetary gain.
The Court reasoned that allowing limits on political contributions was justified
because "[t]o the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid
pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of
representative democracy is undermined." 429
Quid pro quo corruption, however, was ultimately only one of the definitions
advanced, and corruption has meant other things to the Court at other times. If the
Court's definition arguably started off narrow in Buckley, it broadened in Austin,430
and later again in McConnell.431 In Austin the Court recognized "a different type
of corruption,"432 which arose from the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form 433
and "that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's
political ideas."434 This new, broader definition of corruption came to be known as
the "anti-distortion standard."435 The idea behind it was that large accumulations
and spending of corporate wealth would be able to distort the normal political
process.4 36
Later, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, the Court again
J., dissenting).
Id. at 2825.
42s Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
429 Id. 26-27.
410 See generallyAustin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
43 See generallyMcConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010).
432 Austin, 494 U.S. at 659-60.
4 Id. at 660.
434 Id.
435 See Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 127, 134-35 (1997) (discussing Austin's distortion standard).
436 The anti-distortion standard is rooted in strands of democratic theory, including the writings of
scholars who believe that the decisions of public officials should reflect the views of those who elect
them to office. According to this view, campaign contributions corrupt because those who give them do
not reflect the opinion of the average citizen. Id. at 131, 133-35. They "distort" policymaking through
their influence. Id.
426 See id. at 2833 (Kagan,
427
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expanded the definition of corruption, this time showing a degree of deference to
state legislative judgments.4 37 In upholding Missouri's campaign contribution
limits, the Court explained how corruption went beyond quid pro quo
arrangements to cover the threat of "influencing" politicians who are too
"compliant with the wishes of large contributors."438 In a broad sense, the Court
was suggesting that the concept of corruption should be defined beyond merely
bribing government officials.439
The Court went further still in McConnell, where it found that "[j]ust as
troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the
danger that officeholders will decide issues" based on "the wishes of those who have
made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder." 44 0 Here, the Court
broadened the definition of corruption again, now extending it to the "undue
influence" that someone could exert "on an officeholder's judgment. "441 Undue
influence is a different concept both from quid pro quo corruption and
anti-distortion. Quidpro quo corruption implies that it is corrupt for a person who
holds public office to accept money directly in exchange for taking action. With
quid pro quo corruption, the deal is explicit-both sides understand that a trade is
being made. The "undue influence" standard is much broader, however. Here, an
officeholder does not take a contribution in direct exchange for casting his vote a
certain way. Rather, he is corrupt when he casts a vote with any kind of monetary
considerations in mind. 442
In short, the Court began to follow a pattern in its jurisprudence where it would
emphasize the quid pro quo standard of corruption, but then suggest that
corruption implies something else as well. "Once the Supreme Court announced in
Buckley that the concern over corruption or even its appearance could justify
limitations on money in politics," explains Samuel Issacharoff, "the race was on to
fill the porous concept of corruption with every conceivable meaning advocates
could muster."" 3 Our point here is not to provide an exhaustive review of all of the
ways in which the Supreme Court has vacillated when it has come to explaining
what it means by corruption. Rather, it is only to emphasize that its definitions
have suffered from a lack of consistency. What the Supreme Court has considered
corruption to mean has changed over time, often in step with the composition of
the Court itself.
Yet in Citizens United, the Court dramatically narrowed its understanding of
corruption, explicitly overruling Austin and rejecting the anti-distortion
standard. 44 4 In partially overruling McConneBl as well, it found that political access
528 U.S. 377 (2000).
Id. at 389.
4 See id.
' McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310 (2010).
44 Id. at 150.
442 See Burke, supra note 435, at 128-31.
443 Samuel Issacharoff, On PoliticalCorruption,124 HARv. L. REv. 118, 121 (2010).
' Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 348-50 (2010).
4
4
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and influence did not constitute corruption."' In an important part of the opinion,
Justice Kennedy unequivocally stated that when "Buckley identified a sufficiently
important government interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of
corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro quo corruption."" And in
McCutcheon, Chief Justice Roberts held that "[a]ny [state] regulation must . .
target what we have called 'quidpro quo'corruption or its appearance."447 In other
words, Congress may only target the donation of money in direct exchange for an
actual political favor. But Congress may not, under this view, target the "general
gratitude a candidate may feel toward those who support him or his allies, or the
political access such support may afford.448
The narrow quid pro quo view of corruption is unable to account for other
improper influences that are alive and well in our political ecosystem. In the initial
challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that became McConnell, the
district court made numerous important evidentiary findings.449 The district court
found that "[tlhe record powerfully demonstrates that electioneering
communications paid for with the general treasury funds of labor unions and
corporations endears those entities to elected officials in a way that could be
perceived by the public as corrupting."450 There were a number of witnesses who
testified that political parties and candidates used corporate independent
expenditures to circumvent FECA's "hard money" limitations. 451 Further, one
former senator stated that "[c]andidates whose campaigns benefit from [phony
'issue ads'] greatly appreciate the help of these groups. In fact, Members will also be
favorably disposed to those who finance these groups when they later seek access to
discuss pending legislation." 4 5' A lobbyist also testified that "unregulated
expenditures-whether soft money donations to the parties or issue ad
campaigns-can sometimes generate far more influence than direct campaign
contributions."4 53 Based upon the voluminous record before it, the district court
concluded that the government's interest in preventing the appearance of
corruption was itself sufficient to uphold BCRA.454
When McConnell made it to the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens also noted a
number of findings about the factual record. 455 BCRA placed limitations on "soft
money" donations, a limit that was challenged in McConnell. 456 Justice Stevens
Id. at 359-60.
"' Id. at 359.
" McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014).
448 Id.
"' McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2003).
450 Id. at 622-23.
451 See id. at 478-79.
452 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 456 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting
McConnell
v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 556 (D.D.C. 2003)).
4s3 Id.
454 McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 791.
4ss See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 146-53 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310 (2010).
456 Id. at 132.
445
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found that "lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy individuals alike all have candidly
admitted donating substantial sums of soft money to national committees not on
ideological grounds, but for the express purpose of securing influence over federal
officials."457 Justice Stevens further noted how "in 1996 and 2000, more than half of
the top 50 soft-money donors have given substantial sums to both major national
parties, leaving room for no other conclusion but that these donors were seeking
influence, or avoiding retaliation, rather than promoting any particular ideology. "458
As is evident, the evidentiary record in McConnell clearly showed that those who
contribute large sums of money are not necessarily doing so to further their
ideological goals. Some of the wealthy contributors were giving money for the sole
purpose of gaining influence over officeholders.
The Supreme Court, in a different context, has acknowledged that there are
significant problems posed by allowing wealthy interests to influence elections. In
Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Company, Don Blankenship, the CEO of a
corporation with a lawsuit before the West Virginia Supreme Court, poured large
sums of money into the campaign of Brent Benjamin, an allied judicial candidate
who was running for a West Virginia Supreme Court seat.4 59 Don Blankenship
spent about $2.5 million to help Benjamin get elected. The Supreme Court
expressly stated that "[t]hough no . . . bribe or criminal influence was involved, we
recognized that Justice Benjamin would nevertheless feel a debt of gratitude to
Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts to get him elected."46 0 Thus, the Court
recognized that "independent expenditures on candidate elections can raise a
specter of quid pro quo corruption."46 1 Caperton is a good example of why it is
necessary for there to be some regulation of independent expenditures.
The preferences of the wealthy differ markedly from those of the general
public. 462 Not only do wealthy individuals have different policy preferences, but
they also contribute disproportionately to campaigns. Only 0.30% of adult
Americans make campaign contributions of $200 or more.463 Further, only 0.05%
of adults make campaign contributions of $2600 or more.464 According to the 2010
45 Id. at 147.

Id. at 148. This is just an example of the overall findings made by the District Court in
McConnell. Consider the testimony of Former Senator Alan Simpson, who stated that "[w]ho, after all,
can seriously contend that a $100,000 donation does not alter the way one thinks about-and quite
possible votes on-an issue? . . . When you don't pay the piper that finances your campaigns, you will
never get any more money from that piper. Since money is the mother's milk of politics, you never want
to be in that situation." Id. at 149 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 481 (D.D.C.
2003)).
459 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
' Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 458 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 882 (2009)).
46 Id.
' Benjamin 1. Paige, Larry M. Bartels & Jason Seawright, Democracy and the Policy Preferences
of Wealthy Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51, 68 (2013).
' See DonorDemographics, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/donor
demographics.php (last visited May 18, 2015) (all statistics are based upon U.S. Census results as well as
campaign contribution information released by the Federal Election Commission).
4
6 Id.
458
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United States Census, the total adult population was 235,908,179.465 However,
only 1,128 individuals of the total adult population made campaign contributions
of $95,000 or more.4 66 These statistics become even more staggering when one
considers the total amount of money that is being poured into elections. In the
2013-2014 election cycle, over $1.6 billion dollars was raised between the United
States House of Representatives and the United States Senate races. 46' Thomas
Steyer, a liberal hedge fund manager and an environmentalist, contributed a total of
$74 million dollars in the 2013-2014 election cycle alone. 468 Meanwhile, the
conservative billionaires Charles and David Koch have announced their plans to
spend close to $900 million on the 2016 elections.469
Allowing corporations and wealthy individuals to dominate the speech that we
hear when it comes to our politics reduces the voice of average Americans and
causes them to become cynical about their elected officials. The Supreme Court in
Citizens United and McCutcheon trumpeted the cause of the First Amendment in
striking down campaign finance laws, but what it was actually doing was
diminishing the influence of the speech of the average person. The majority of
people in this country do not contribute in any significant way to the campaigns of
political candidates. Despite this, they are entitled to vote in elections and to have
their voice be heard by the government. However, their voices are now being
subsumed.
H. The Evidence ofDisruption
Citizens United and similar Roberts Court decisions have degraded what was
an already troubled free speech ecology. When one perspective substantially
overwhelms its competitors, democratic dialogue becomes seriously degraded.
When the only way candidates have a shot at office is by relying on support from
corporations or wealthy contributors, the trust relation between the public official
and citizens is undermined. Our history shows that for free speech to work, the
ecosystem that embraces it has to be somewhat anti-hierarchical and egalitarian.
But economic and political changes, especially those changing the concentration of
media ownership and expanding "corporate free speech," can affect this function.
An environment of unlimited corporate spending on speech, either punishing
congressmen who oppose the agenda of corporate interests or rewarding those who
toe the corporate line, can go a long way to overwhelming the speech of ordinary
465

Id.

Id.
See 2014 Election Overview, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview (last
visited May 18, 2015) (disclosing that all House candidates for the 2013-14 election cycle raised
$1,039,770,742 while all Senate candidates for the same cycle raised $608,241,906).
" See Top Individual Contributors: All Federal Contributions, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topindivs.php (last visited May 18, 2015).
" Nicholas Confessore, Koch Brothers'Budget of $889 Million for 2016 Is on Par with Both
Parties'Spending, N.Y. TIMES (an. 26, 2015), bttp://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/us/politics/kochs
-plan-to-spend-900-million-on-2016-campaign.html?_r=O.
466
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people. It can produce a debate so one-sided that the democratic function of free
speech-to provide citizens with sufficient information from competing
perspectives-is undermined. This is particularly significant since so many of us
receive our news today from television and from media companies.47 0
The larger idea that a political ecosystem exists helps us to understand why,
whatever their superficial appeal, decisions like Citizens United, McCutcheon,
Davis, and Arizona Free Enterprisewere wrongly decided. It is a mistake to view
these cases in isolation, disconnected from the environment necessary to protect
democracy and disconnected from other developments that threaten meaningfil
democratic free speech. Citizens United single-handedly expanded corporate
"independent" ads (directly or more often through front groups), and further
expanded pervasive corporate political influence. 47 ' To the extent that "hot-button
issues" such as abortion and school prayer dominate elections, 472 this may simply
indicate the extent to which corporate contributions through ordinary PACs often
kept many issues of concern to ordinary voters off the agenda. Now that
corporations can act through Super PACs, 4 73 corporate independent spending has
expanded and will only continue to rise.474
In the years since the Citizens United decision, the dominance of big money
over politics has grown tremendously. 475 Whereas a functioning democracy requires
a government responsive to the people, who each have a say in the decisions that
affect their lives-or at least an equal voice in choosing the decision-makers-today
we have a small group of elites that makes up the donor class that shapes our
government and effectively determines public policy. Studies tell us that "[o]n
470 See KRISTEN PURCELL ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., UNDERSTANDING THE
PARTICIPATORY NEWS CONSUMER (2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2010/03/01
/understanding-the-participatory-news-consumer (reporting that 59% of Americans "get news from a
combination of online and offline sources . . . and the internet is now the third most popular news
platform, behind local television news and national television news").
17 According to the Center for Responsive Politics, outside groups spent nearly $500 million in the
2010 election cycle to run independent ads, make phone calls, and distribute literature. 2010 Outside
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle
Spending,
OPENSECRETS.ORG

=2010&chrt=V&disp=O&type=P (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce spent
over $32 million, which was the most of any outside group. See Outside Spending,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/index.php (last visited May 18,

2015).
472 Samuel Issacharoff, supra note 443, at 131.

473 For instance, it is estimated that health-insurance companies secretly funneled at least $10
million to the Chamber of Commerce anonymously for commercials attacking President Obama's
health-care legislation. See Eric Lipton, Mike McIntire & Don Van Natta, Jr., Large Donations Aid

US. ChamberinElection Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2010, at Al.
4. In the 2010 election cycle, 72% of the campaign spending by outside groups came from sources
that were prohibited from making contributions in 2006. See Spencer MacColl, Citizens United
Decision Profoundly Affects Political Landscape, OPENSECRETS.ORG (May 5,
2011),
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2011/05/citizens-united-decision-profoundly-affects-politicallandscape.html.
47 See, e.g., Demos, Election Spending 2012: Post-Election Analysis of Federal Election
Commission Data (June 24, 2015), available at http://www.demos.org/publication/election-spending2012-post-election-analysis-federal-election-commission-data.
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many important issues the preferences of the wealthy appear to differ markedly
from those of the general public."47 6 This is a troubling conclusion when
considering the impact that Citizens United, McCutcheon, Davis, and Arizona
Free Enterprise will have on the amount of money that corporations and wealthy
individuals will now be permitted to spend on campaigns. A report on outside
spending on Senate races that was recently issued by the Brennan Center found
many worrying trends in this regard. 4 77 just a few of them are worth mentioning.
The report's key finding was that outside spending by a tiny number of very
wealthy donors has played an increasingly important role in each federal election
since Citizens United. Such spending on Senate elections has more than doubled
since 2010, increasing to $486 million in 2014.478 Moreover, outside groups spent
more than candidates in 2014's closest races. The report notes that "[a]cross the ten
competitive races [for which candidate spending data could be located], outside
groups accounted for the greatest share of spending, at 47 percent. Candidates
lagged behind with 41 percent, and [political] parties accounted for 12 percent." 4 79
The report further concludes that "[c]andidates were outspent by outside groups
and parties together in eight of the 10 races. In four of the contests (Alaska,
Colorado, Iowa, and North Carolina), candidates made only a third or less of the
total expenditures" 480
Super PACs are now funded by an exclusive few, and they drove much of the
high outside spending: they comprised half of 2014's top ten Senate election
spenders. 481 This money comes from a small number of donors who give massive
amounts. In contrast to candidates and parties, Super PACs, which were created
after Citizens United and were largely the product of a case decided by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit called Speechnow.org
v. FEC,48 2 can accept contributions of unlimited size, and they tend to depend on
six- and seven-figure contributions for the greatest part of their revenue. 8 In the
three federal elections held since Citizens Unitedwas decided, there has been more
than $1 billion in Super PAC spending. 48 4 Just 195 individuals and their spouses
gave almost 60% of that money-more than $600 million. 485 The pattern is not
limited to super PACs; in the 2014 elections, the 100 biggest donors to all types of
political committees together gave $323 million, almost matching the $356 million
476

Paige, Bartels, & Seawright, supra note 462, at 68.

IAN VANDEWALKER, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, ANALYSIS: ELECTION SPENDING
2014: OUTSIDE SPENDING IN SENATE RACEs SINCE CITIZENS UNITED (2015), available at
4

https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Outside%20Spending%20Since%2OCitiz
ens%20United.pdf.
.. Id. at 1.
479 Id.
480

Id.

Id. at 7.
482 Speechnow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (en banc).
483 VANDEWALKER, ELECTION SPENDING 2014, supra note 477,
at 7.
484 Id.
485 _d.
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48 6
in small donations that came from an estimated 4.75 million people.
An even greater problem to emerge is the existence of new expenditures by
groups that do not fully disclose their donors. The spending of these so-called
"dark money groups" in Senate elections has gone from $105 million in
inflation-adjusted dollars in 2010, to $167 million in 2012, to $226 million in
2014.487 Almost half of the $1 billion in 2014 dollars that outside spenders plowed
into Senate elections over the last three cycles, or $485 million, was dark money. 488
The wealthy individuals who contribute to these groups do not reflect the concerns
of the average American citizen. And yet, they contribute disproportionately to
campaigns. Of all adults in the United States who can contribute to campaigns,
only 0.30% make campaign contributions of $200 or more,48 only 0.05% make
contributions of $2600 or more, 49 0 and only 1,128 individuals made contributions
of $95,000 or more. 49' These small numbers become even more startling when one
considers the large amount of money that is being poured into elections by these
few individuals. In the 2013-2014 alone, over $1.5 billion dollars was raised by
candidates seeking seats in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. 492
Citizens United declared that it was unconstitutional to restrict a corporation
from spending its treasury money to support or attack candidates in elections, and,
together with Speechnow.org, led to unlimited contributions to outside groups
such as Super PACs and tax-exempt non-profits.493 These decisions have allowed
concentrated big money in politics to increase, further marginalizing those without
vast wealth in our political system. In the 2012 election, just 31,385 donors who
make up .01% of all Americans contributed more than 28% of the money spent. 494
Small donors, or those who gave less than $200, did not play nearly as significant of
a role. For example, in 2014, the $313 million raised by Barack Obama and Mitt
Romney from all of their small donors combined-over 4 million people giving less
than $200-was matched by just the top 32 donors to Super PACs who gave an
average of $9.9 million each.4 95 As the public policy organization Demos notes in a
recent report: "These elite few donors become gatekeepers. Since [candidates] who
spend the most money win the vast majority of the time, our current system leaves
our representatives dependent on a tiny slice of the wealthiest few in what is
essentially a wealth primary."4 96
Allowing corporations and the wealthy to influence our political system reduces
486

Id.

487
488
419
490

Id. at 13.

Id. at 2.
Donor Demographics, supra note 463.
Id.
491 Id.
492 id.
493 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
49 Liz Kennedy, Top 5 Ways Citizens United Harms Democracy and Top 5 Ways We're Fighting
to Take Democracy Back, DEMOS (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publication
s/Citizens%20United%20Top%205_0.pdf.
495 Id.
496 id.
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the influence of the average American. It also causes the average citizen to become
cynical about whether his elected official is acting in his interests. The Supreme
Court claims to be striking down campaign finance regulations in the name of the
First Amendment, but what it is really doing is diminishing the speech, and by
extension the democratic influence, of the average American. The vast majority of
people in this country cannot contribute in any significant way to the campaigns of
political candidates. Despite this, average Americans are still entitled to vote in
elections and to have their voices be heard. Yet their views and voices are being
marginalized by the millions of dollars being spent to influence campaigns by
corporations, special interests, and rich donors. As Demos further notes in its
report: "The problem is that our current system for funding elections allows a few
people and special interests to have much more power over the direction of our
country than the vast majority of Americans, who have different views on public
policy than the wealthy elite." 497
Americans have been fighting to control the improper influence of money in
government, whether from wealthy individuals or corporate interests, since the
founding of their republic. But we are at a low point. Large financial interests wield
tremendous political power, and much of the blame rests squarely on the Supreme
Court and its campaign finance decisions. Americans across the political spectrum
understand that the current rules for using money in politics give the wealthy
greater political power and prevent the rest of our citizenry from having an equal
chance to influence a government that is not serving their interests but rather
special interests. Comprehensive, structural changes are needed to stop the
anti-democratic results of the current system. We believe many practical solutions
already exist to help build a new system.
V. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION

A. A Revived Lochner Era
Wrongly decided Supreme Court decisions are not new in American history. 498
Dred Scott stripped the national government of the power to ban slavery in federal
territories and not only opened new territories to slavery, 499 but also threatened to
make our nation far less democratic. Lochner v. New York threatened to take away
the power of our democratically elected legislatures to pass laws that would protect
health and safety. The Court's decisions in Citizens United, McCutcheon, Davis,
and Arizona Free Enterprise go even further, however, in that they threaten to
Id.
See generally Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903) (dismissing a challenge of Alabama laws that
prevented black citizens from voting); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (rejecting a
challenge of Mississippi's literacy and poll tax requirements that, in practice, prevented black citizens
from voting); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (holding that civil rights abuses by
private citizens could not be prosecuted under federal law); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1857) (holding that slaves were not considered "citizens" under the Constitution).
4 See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393.
497
491
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change the nature of our democratic system itself. In finding that corporations
possess First Amendment rights, the Court has impermissibly further expanded the
influence that corporations play in our democratic free speech system. Instead of
merely voiding progressive legislation, as the Court in Lochner did, the Roberts
Court has altered the political landscape so that the voices of those who control
corporations and of the very wealthy now dominate. The result is to make
progressive legislation far less likely to pass.
In the Lochner era, the Supreme Court viewed the power of the corporate
employer to determine the terms of its employment contract through the lens of
liberty. State statutes that sought to regulate the hours of workers,soo their pay,so' or
their right to join a union502 were understood to be violations of the natural order
and of the freedom of contract. In a similar vein, the Roberts Court sees efforts to
limit the "speech" of corporations as a violation of liberty. In the Lochner era,
efforts to equalize bargaining power were viewed as being illegitimate. In the
Citizens United era, efforts to equalize speech so that all candidates could have
opportunities of reaching the voters are seen as being illegitimate. 0 3 When
Congress and the state of Arizona each attempted to regulate the political arena so
that opponents of wealthy self-financed candidates would have a more adequate
chance to be heard, the Court found this to chill the wealthy politician's speech.504
As a result of the Supreme Court's decisions, voters are now far less likely to hear
the diverse perspectives of less well-funded candidates.
Though Citizens United, McCutcheon, Davis, and Arizona Free Enterprise
were wrongly decided, hard questions remain. The freedom of the press protects
media outlets from government censorship. But our media is becoming increasingly
consolidated, and much of it is now in the hands of a few corporations. While the
media plays an important role in checking the power of government, it does not
follow that a consolidated corporate media should be permitted to monopolize the
debate on television. A remedy is needed. To have meaningful free speech, we
should institute some degree of equality in access to the airways and cableways,
even if we cannot have equal access to the political arena. As Justice Rehnquist
noted in his dissent in Bellotti, there is little reason to fear that voices of the

s See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1908).
51 See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261
U.S. 525 (1923).
502 See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
so3 In the Lochner era, the Court similarly gave little or no weight to the findings of the legislature
on the health effects of working long hours. Taking steps to mitigate these effects-not to mention the
gross inequality in bargaining power between the corporation and its employee-was seen as an
unconstitutional purpose of legislation. In the Citizens United era, it was not a state legislative but
Congress itself which recognized the corrupting effect of corporate "independent expenditures" on
elections. Still, no legislative deference was allowed. Attempting to protect a degree of equality and
diversity in political speech was again an unconstitutional objective. For discussion of the Lochner era,

see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER
ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993); ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND
THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895 (1976).

s Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
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wealthy or of corporate interests would be stifled.sos Meanwhile, we would allow
the voices of the less wealthy finally to be heard.
B. A New FairnessDoctrine
There are significant constitutional interests on both sides of the equation when
it comes to campaign finance. On the one hand, there are corporations and wealthy
individuals who wish to spend money on campaigns. On the other side, there is the
interest of less powerful voices that also deserve to be heard, and the related interest
of voters in being able to elect candidates who are not excessively dependent on the
very wealthy. In addition, the government also has an interest in protecting the
integrity of our political system as a whole. In order to properly balance the
competing constitutional issues that are at stake, we call for the Supreme Court to
change its First Amendment analysis and to do a better job of balancing these
competing interests.
The Fairness Doctrine emerged during the mid-twentieth century. The Federal
Communications Commission developed the doctrine, and a 1959 amendment to
the Federal Communications Act was widely interpreted as codifying it.so6 Under
the Fairness Doctrine, politically one-sided radio and television programs were
problematic. Thus, "broadcasters" had an obligation to operate in the public
interest, including by affording a reasonable opportunity for the public to hear and
50 7
view conflicting views on issues of public importance.
The Federal Communications Commission's opinions and guidelines for
interpreting the Fairness Doctrine were general, not entirely consistent, and often
somewhat vague.s5 0 Nonetheless, significantly in Cullman Broadcasting Co.,' the
FCC held that the doctrine required broadcasters to provide a forum for the
expression of contrasting views at their own expense if paid sponsorship could not
be found. 10 This decision required some degree of balance for ballot measures such
as referenda, including free time if paying sponsors could not be found. It was also
applied to cigarette ads, but the free-time rule was not applied to political
candidates.s"' One part of the Fairness Doctrine required broadcasters to air issues
which are "so critical or of such great public importance that it would be
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 828 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" See Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-274, 73 Stat. 557.
507 T. BARTON CARTER, MARC A. FRANKLIN & JAY B. WRIGHT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND THE FIFTH ESTATE: REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA 195 (5th ed. 1999). An
amendment to § 315 of the Federal Communications Act provided that "nothing in the foregoing
sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters ... from the obligation imposed upon them under
this act to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of
conflicting views on issues of public importance." Act of Sept. 14, 1959.
s" Id. at 196-98 (citing Reconsideration of the Fairness Report, 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976)).
so' 40 F.C.C. 576, 577 (1963).
505

s1o CARTER, FRANKLIN &WRIGHT, supra note 507, at 198.

s11 Id. at 201, 208. The requirement for anti-cigarette ads was upheld in Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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unreasonable for a licensee to ignore them completely."512 A second part of the
Fairness Doctrine required broadcasters to take steps to assure that on
"controversial issues of public importance" contrasting views are presented.s 3
The Fairness Doctrine was ultimately eliminated by the Federal
Communications Commission in 1987, during the presidency of Ronald Reagan.514
In a 1985 report, the FCC decided that the doctrine was no longer justified.s1
While it recognized the important public interest "in obtaining access to diverse
and antagonistic sources of information," the need for diversity was said to be "fully
served by the multiplicity of voices in the marketplace today."5 " The FCC noted
the great increase in the number of radio and television outlets, the development of
other distribution channels, such as cable, and the many daily newspapers and
magazines already in existence.s"7 It also found that the application of the Fairness
Doctrine worked to restrict the journalistic freedom of broadcasters.5 1 In 1985, the
FCC had originally refused to eliminate the doctrine in light of its apparent
congressional codification, but it reconsidered its decision in response to court
decisions and soon eliminated the doctrine entirely.5 1 When the doctrine was
reintroduced again by Congress, President Reagan vetoed it.5 20
One solution to the domination of the press by corporate power would be to
pass legislation establishing a modern fairness doctrine. On matters of public
concern, where the marketplace of ideas fails to provide adequate time for
alternative perspectives on radio, television, or cable, a media company would be
required to provide free time to opposing viewpoints. On matters of public
concern, including initiatives and referenda, the rule might require one-third of the
time devoted to an issue in paid advertisements on one side to be balanced at least
by one-third free or reduced rates for the contrasting view. For candidates, a
sensible rule might require free television, radio, and cable time for advertisements
for those who have raised a certain amount in small-dollar contributions. For
candidates outspent by a ratio of more than three to one, the rule might
additionally require free time to respond up to one third of the time used by
wealthier interests. We concede that this approach is contrary to current Court
512
513

Id. at 195.
Id.

514 Id. at 209.
515

Id.

Id. (citing 1985 Fairness Report, 102 F.C.C.2d 143 (1985)).
Id. at 209-10.
51s Id. at 209.
s1 Id.; see also Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 872-74 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Telecomm.
Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 518 (D.C. Cit. 1986).
520 ERIC ALTERMAN, WHAT LIBERAL MEDIA?: THE TRUTH ABOUT BIAS AND THE NEWS
71-72 (2003). Though the Fairness Doctrine was vague, technical, and obviously subject to potential
abuse, the world that has replaced it is even more problematic. This is especially so because television
has become an even more powerful media. On television today, it is far from clear that the marketplace
of ideas is regularly providing adequately detailed and accurate information, not to mention a balance or
diversity of views. While we have a multiplicity of channels and shows, they are increasing owned by
small number of consolidated media companies and the viewpoints they present are more uniform than
ever. Id.
516
517
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decisions, yet we also believe that this is a path that the majority of the American
public supports.s2 1 Such a doctrine would encourage democratic dialogue. After all,
what the Court once said about radio is as relevant to television and the Internet
today:
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and
purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not
the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. . . . It is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market

We are aware that our proposed solution would pose management problems,
but those problems should be compared to the current system. We are also aware
that our proposed reforms might require a change in the composition of the Court
and new legislation that would be remarkably hard to pass. But passing a
constitutional amendment, which many scholars suggest as an alternative, poses an
even greater challenge. That is especially so when powerful private interests are
threatened. Still, it is hard to imagine more necessary solutions. A modern fairness
doctrine would expand the nature of the dialogue. If corporate and wealthy
interests believe their arguments can withstand being contested, they should be
willing to enter the fray, even if they might ultimately be limited to speaking only
twice as loudly as their opponents.
C. Other Possible Solutions
In addition to the Fairness Doctrine, the Supreme Court should also establish a
test that better accounts for the competing interests at hand. The Supreme Court
has already established several balancing tests under the First Amendment. All
First Amendment rules involve some type of balancing, including "categorical
balancing" where the rule is arrived at in advance by balancing competing
interests, 522 or "ad hoc balancing" where multiple factors are weighed as new
situations arise. 23 In crafting its campaign finance rules, the Court has failed to
balance adequately the need for greater access to the free speech system by
underfunded candidates, the need for a workable democracy that better reflects the
desires of the voters, and the need to curb the corruption that results when
candidates are too reliant on contributions from wealthy interests. Contrary to
Arizona Free Enterprise, we favor a categorical rule that would allow viewpoint
neutral subsidies for candidates' political speech and limited catch-up provisions to
protect those who accept public financing from being overwhelmed. In a sense, the
See Confessore, supra note 469.
See, e.g,, Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
" See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (balancing the interest of a social security
disability claimant against the government's interests in the risk of making erroneous decisions).
521
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Court already approved subsidized speech, when it upheld the public funding of
presidential campaigns in Buckley. In other contexts, subsidies have enriched the
democratic free speech system. The public forum subsidized speech, while reducing
the ability of wealthy interests to dominate the discourse. Early in American
history, Congress subsidized newspaper exchanges, a decision that also limited the
ability of wealthy interest to dominate the discourse.
The Supreme Court's categorical balancing should also balance the interests of
wealthy individuals and corporations who wish to make large political contributions
against the government's interest in combatting corruption and maintaining the
integrity of the political system. As it stands, the Court's analysis in Citizens
United and McCutcheon does not place enough weight on the government's
interest in preserving the integrity of our political ecosystem. The Court seems to
have deferred to the First Amendment "rights" of corporate and wealthy interests
that wish to donate significant amounts of money to political candidates, instead of
engaging in a true effort to balance these interests against competing interests that
challenge them. In order to be more faithful to the purposes of the First
Amendment, the Court must give equal weight to the government's interests in
maintaining a workable democracy.
The First Amendment is not violated when the government places the overall
integrity of our political system over the ability of corporations and wealthy
individuals to donate large sums of money. Currently, only 0.23% of Americans,
and 0.30% of adult Americans, make campaign contributions of $200 or more.524
That small percentage of the population contributes a disproportionate amount of
money to political candidates and committees in any given election cycle.525 While
this small percentage of Americans clearly has First Amendment rights, it
constitutes a very small percentage of the population. The First Amendment
should not be violated when Congress places the integrity of our political system
over the interests of a small percentage of the population. Congress may reasonably
decide that placing a modest burden on a few people is necessary in order to
maintain the integrity of the political system. As Justice Stevens said in Citizens
United, "[a] democracy cannot function effectively when its constituent members
believe laws are being bought and sold."526 Judicial findings made in the initial
challenge to BCRA supported the conclusion that large contributions work to buy
increased influence.527 They showed the risk of corruption from large contributions
524 DonorDemographics, supra note 463.
s See id.

s Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 453 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
s.. Id. at 448-50. In the initial challenge to the BCRA, the District Court made a number of
interesting findings. Congress had also developed a vast record when passing the BCRA, which was in
front ofJudge Kollar-Kotelly in the District Court precursor to McConnell v. FEC. For example, Judge
Kollar-Kotelly noted that "[t]he factual findings of the Court illustrate that corporations and labor
unions routinely notify Members of Congress as soon as they air electioneering communications relevant
to the Members' elections. The record also indicates that Members express appreciation to organizations
for the airing of these election-related advertisements." McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d at
555-560, 622-25. Further, "[p]olitical consultants testify that campaigns are quite aware of who is
running advertisements on the candidate's behalf, when they are being run, and where they are being
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to be real and not speculative.
The other significant interests that do not get enough attention in the context
of campaign finance regulation are the interests of average Americans in having
their voices heard and the interest in hearing multiple perspectives. Allowing
corporations, special interests, and wealthy individuals to donate large amounts of
money diminishes the ability of the average American to share his opinions with
his representatives. While "the people" control who gets elected, in fact the
inability of candidates without great resources to complete typically winnows the
field and provides "the people" with restricted choices.528 They also have little say
over what their representatives do once they get elected. Meanwhile, corporations
and wealthy individuals with vast sums of money often use it to influence the
representatives once they are in office. The result is a political system that also
corrupts the market system. Instead of rewards for contributions to society, large
529
businesses and their officers too often get rewards for contributions to politicians.
By "increasing" the First Amendment protections for wealthy individuals and
corporations with respect to campaign contributions, the Supreme Court is
effectively reducing the influence of the speech of the rest of the population.
The new landscape of campaign finance has the effect of marginalizing the
voices of the majority of Americans. The average American in this country does
not have the financial means to contribute in any significant way to a political
candidate and the only time he can influence politics is when he votes. 30 But even
if voters are able to elect their candidate of choice, there is no guarantee their
representatives will be able act in their best interests. With the amount of money
pouring into political campaigns, the concerns of the general population are being
diminished.s 3 ' While corporations and wealthy individuals are protected under the
First Amendment, they do not have the right to silence the concerns and views of
ordinary members of the population and to undermine the fiduciary duties elected
run. Likewise, a prominent lobbyist testifies that these organizations use issue advocacy as a means to
influence various Members of Congress." Id.
528
See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: How MONEY CORRUPTS
POLITICS-AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2012).
529 See generallyJOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: How TODAY'S DIVIDED
SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE (2013).
s30 In other words, it seems that voting is becoming less important and money is becoming more
important. For example, in the 2008 elections, "93 percent of House of Representative races and 94
percent of Senate races" were won by the candidate who spent the most money. See Money Wins
Presidencyand 9 of 10 CongressionalRaces in Priciest U.S. Election Ever, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Nov.
5, 2008), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2008/11/money-wins-white-house-and. Further, it cost
$1.1 million on average to win a House of Representatives race and about $6.5 million to win a Senate
seat. Id. It is also important to keep in mind that these statistics were from the 2008 elections, before
the Supreme Court decisions in Citizens Unitedand McCutcheon.
53 For example, in the 2014 House of Representative races, there was a total of $1.03 billion raised
between both democratic and republican candidates. 2014 Election Overview, supra note 467. Further,
as is discussed above, only 0.23% of the general American population and 0.30% of the adult population
gives more than S200 in political donation. Donor Demographics, supra note 463. Thus, that $1.03
billion (just for House races) comes disproportionately from a small percentage of the population. See
2014 Election Overview, supra note 467.
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officials owe to citizens.
The Supreme Court should also return to the definition of corruption which it
embraced prior to Citizens United. Until the decision in Citizens United, the
Supreme Court had held that the corruption interest encompasses not only quid
pro quo corruption but also "undue influence" corruption as well.s3 2 But as Justice
Stevens said in his dissent in that case, "the difference between selling a vote and
selling access is a matter of degree, not kind.""' The limited definition of
corruption severely limits Congress's ability to reform the law.
If the Supreme Court only recognizes an interest in eliminating quid pro quo
corruption, Congress is unable to pass laws to deal with undue influence. Based
upon the voluminous record before the Supreme Court in McConnell, it is clear
that large donations buy increased access to members of Congress."' While the
Supreme Court currently does not consider increased access to constitute
"corruption," such access can be as damaging to public confidence as the money
given to buy votes. The increased influence of large donations leads 69% of our
population to believe that Congress acts not on behalf of the people, but on behalf
of special interests.s3 s When public confidence in our political system deteriorates,
the whole ecosystem suffers. Thus the Supreme Court needs to embrace a
definition of corruption broader than quid pro quo corruption so that Congress can
pass laws to maintain the integrity of the political system.
In addition to bringing back the Fairness Doctrine, utilizing a better categorical
balancing test, and expanding the definition of corruption, we consider one more
solution-substantially increasing the role for public financing. Publically financing
campaigns is a legitimate means of attempting to reduce the influence of large
contributions from private entities. If a candidate is not beholden to the wealthy
individuals or corporations that spend large amounts of money to influence his
campaign, the risk of corruption significantly diminishes. Instead of campaigns
being won by the candidate who is able to raise the most money, they would be
won by the candidate who spends his allotment of campaign funds most efficiently.
Further, the public financing of campaigns would operate to promote "the values
underlying both the First Amendment and our entire Constitution by enhancing
the 'opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be

532 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 447 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("On numerous occasions we have
recognized Congress' legitimate interest in preventing the money that is spent on elections from
exerting an 'undue influence on an officeholders judgment' and from creating 'the appearance of such
influence,' beyond the sphere of quidpro quo relationships." (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93,

150 (2003))).
53

Id.

534 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 146. The record before the Court in McConnell consisted of
testimony from members of Congress, lobbyists, and other persons involved in the political process.
Their testimony clearly showed that large donations purchase increased access and influence and that
members of Congress do not want to "bite the hand that feeds them." Id.
s.s Frank Newport, Americans: My Member OK, Most in Congress Are Not, GALLUP (Oct. 15,
2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/178487/americans-member-congress-not.aspx. The same Gallup
poll found that 54% of the population believes that Congress as a whole is corrupt. Id.
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responsive to the will of the people."' 536
Congress could, for example, pass a law allowing all qualified federal candidates
to receive automatic public funding. To qualify, a candidate would have to raise a
certain amount of small-dollar contributions. Any person who wishes to run for
federal office would be eligible to receive public funding under these terms.5 3 7
The effect of this public financing program would reduce the influence that
"massive pools of private money" have in our political system. 538 The program
would allow every serious candidate to start off on equal footing. Those candidates
who could not obtain contributions from private parties would still be able to
launch their campaigns, relying solely on public funds. After all, "[c]andidates who
rely on public, rather than private, moneys are 'beholden [to] no person and, if
elected, should feel no post-election obligation toward any contributor." 539 But the
program would not eliminate private contributions. Rather, it would allow those
who wish to spend above the level of public financing to do so, but at least this way
every candidate would have some basic level of support and a diversity of voices
would have a chance of being heard, at least in the initial stages of a political
campaign.
An automatic public financing program would also make the government more
responsive to the will of the people. If elected officials are receiving public funding,
they will be more willing to listen to the constituents who elected them instead of
to large contributors whose money they previously needed to rely on to reach those
constituents. As Justice Kagan pointed out in her dissent in Arizona Free
Enterprise, "[b]y supplanting private cash in elections, public financing eliminates
the source of political corruption."54 0 Public financing could also lead to better
information and to more discussion concerning the important issues disseminated
to the public. If all candidates received a lump sum with which to start their
campaigns, they would be forced to find ways to spend that money efficiently, and
the voters would no doubt take note of what the candidates did with this public
money. The public would be somewhat less inundated with advertisements during
election season and would be provided overall better information.
In sum, if Congress were to adopt automatic public financing for all federal
elections, it would be able to eliminate some of the dangers posed by large
contributions and expenditures. Elected officials would not feel as much gratitude
towards any particular person or group that helped to get them elected. This would
leave members of Congress more free to vote and act according to their conscience
without worrying about losing funding from an irritated donor. Further, such a
public financing system would restore confidence in our political system. It would
bring a much-needed balance, and diversity, to our political ecosystem.
536 Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2830 (2011) (Kagan,
dissenting) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
s' Under this imaginary program, every person, a challenger and incumbent, would receive the
exact same amount of money to run a campaign.
s3 Ariz. Free Enter., 131 S. Ct. at 2830 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
s3 Id. (quoting Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
5
Id.

J.,
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CONCLUSION

The Court has long recognized that a crucial function of free speech is to
promote democratic government. The idea that public officials have a fiduciary
duty to serve their principal-"We the People"-is older than the Republic itself.
The framers recognized that this principle was threatened by corruption and that
corruption was not limited, as it is for the majority in Citizens United, to quid pro
quo bribes. 54 1 It could also be threatened by dependent relations created by great
wealth. If free speech is to serve and advance the interests of democracy, it cannot
simply treat the money of the wealthy the same as it treats the speech of ordinary
citizens. When a corporate entity or a group of people has the power to dominate
the discourse in the political arena, that discourse is cheapened and democracy is
harmed. The Supreme Court's current approach promotes the corruption of our
political process. Sadly, most Americans agree. As Justice Stevens noted in Citizens
United: "The majority declares by fiat that the appearance of undue influence by
high-spending corporations will not cause the electorate to lose faith in our
democracy.... The electorate itself has consistently indicated otherwise. .. ."542
Government action to further the basic ideals of free speech is not always a
threat to our democratic principles. But unleashed corporate power and unmatched
private wealth in the electoral system can be a serious threat to democracy and to
basic free speech ideals. Our best free speech ideals were anti-hierarchical. They
were premised on the belief that the best policies are drawn from understanding
multiple perspectives and that citizens need to hear many sides of a story to make
wise decisions. A decision that allows the CEOs of a few large corporations or a
few millionaires to monopolize the discourse is contrary to that principle. Free
speech was always substantially egalitarian. It should remain so.
The lesson that we should draw from studying our history of speech is that
government action furthers free speech when it creates, protects, and enhances a
forum where speech from multiple perspectives can be heard. That is the lesson of
our past Supreme Court decisions, such as those that found the Associated Press's
telegraph monopoly hostile to free speech, or that the closing of common areas of
"private" shopping malls was an affront to the values of an open society. 543 The
Fairness Doctrine, with all its faults, was also an effort to prevent a few corporate
media outlets from dominating the airwaves and excluding diverse perspectives.
Citizens Unitedand its progeny have allowed corporate and wealthy interests to
dominate our political discourse. Through its campaign finance decisions, the
Roberts Court has entrenched the interests of those who already have great wealth
and power. This power has intimidated and seduced candidates in both parties.
History has shown such power to be immensely effective in undermining truly
representative government. It is a risk democracy should not be required to run in
541

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).

542 Id. at 450 n.64 (internal quotation marks ornitted).
54 Amalgated Food Employees Union Local 590, v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968)

(overruled in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.551 (1972)).
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the interest of allowing a few leaders of large corporations to use other people's
money to advance their chosen political objectives and in the interest of allowing a
few millionaires and billionaires to be effectively free from the effects of contrary
speech.

